

THE CAPTIVITY AND DEATH
OF
EDWARD OF CARNARVON

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
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THE CAPTIVITY AND DEATH OF EDWARD OF CARNARVON.¹

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DURING the last few years a good deal of energy has been put into the study of the reign of Edward II, and a considerable amount of new light has been thrown on the character of that period. As a result there has been some modest sort of rehabilitation, not indeed of the king, but of the times in which he lived. The easy generalisation which saw in the personality of the ruler the character of the age is not one which commends itself to the modern historian. We no longer believe all England virtuous and pious, because Oliver Cromwell was a good family man and a convinced Puritan, and that then suddenly in 1660 all England became vicious, because Charles II was not a model husband and believed that Presbyterianism was no religion for a gentleman. Similarly there is no need to accept the view that the age of the heroes died with the hero-king Edward I, and that, because Edward II was a scatter-brained wastrel, all the troubles of his twenty years' reign came by the following of his example. Even in mediæval history, where the personality of the ruler counted for much, a weak king might reign decently, if the men who ruled in his name were competent to carry on the administrative machine.

Accordingly it has been urged that the reign of Edward II has an importance of its own, however insignificant may be the character of that ruler. It has been shown that in these twenty years the military system was reconstituted by reason of the borrowing by the

¹ An elaboration of the lecture delivered in the chapter house of Gloucester Cathedral on 27 February to the Gloucester and Cheltenham branch of the Historical Association, and in the John Rylands Library, 10 March, 1920.

English of the lessons learnt from the Scots at Bannockburn, and by applying them with such thoroughness that the battle array of Crecy and Poitiers was already in existence when it was revealed to the Continent by the French Wars of Edward III. Again there is reason for recognising that Edward II's reign is a period of great importance in administrative history. The king's favourite, the younger Despenser, was among the few radical reformers in mediæval English history, and his openness to new ideas gave the official class the chance of reforming their administrative departments and making them more efficient and up to date. In the theory of politics too the Whig doctrine of government by a complaisant monarch, ruling only with the counsel and consent of his natural advisers, the territorial magnates of the land, found under Edward II a more complete expression than it ever attained again before the Revolution of 1399. Even in the economic sphere the Staple system of state regulated foreign trade, once ascribed to the wisdom of Edward III, is found to have grown up almost by itself in the reign of Edward II. Save for one hideous period of famine, the period was not particularly unprosperous, and, save for the desolation of the North by the Scots, was fairly peaceful, that is, according to the not too exacting standard of the middle ages.

However much we may strive to claim more importance for the period than historians have always allowed, there has been no attempt to rehabilitate the character of Edward II. That king still remains to the modern historian exactly what he was to the chroniclers of his own and the next succeeding age. He is still, as Stubbs truly said, the first king after the Norman Conquest who was not a man of business. Tall, well-built, strong and handsome, he had no serious purpose in life, no better policy than to amuse himself and to save himself worry and trouble. He is one of the best mediæval examples of the brutal and brainless athlete, established on a throne. He was not, I suspect, exceptionally vicious or depraved. He was just incompetent, idle, frivolous, and incurious. Most of his distractions, for which his nobles severely blamed him, seem to us harmless enough; but contemporary opinion saw something ignoble and unkingly in a monarch who forsook the society of the magnates, his natural associates, and lived with courtiers, favourites, officials on the make, and even men of meaner estate, grooms, watermen, actors, buffoons, ditchers and

delvers and other craftsmen. He lived hard and drank deeply. He was inconstant and untrustworthy, and could not keep a secret. He had so ungovernable a temper, and lost control of himself so easily that anyone who excited his wrath was liable to receive a sound drubbing from his royal hands. His supreme fault was that, being too idle to rule the country himself, he handed over the government to his personal friends and household servants. He not only refused to associate with the nobles ; he neglected their counsels and declined to share power with them. This was his great offence to the grim lords of the time ; this was the crime for which they could not forgive him.

Had the barons worked together as a single party, they could easily have reduced the weak king to helplessness. But the magnates were so distracted by local and family feuds that it required some great crisis to make them take up a common line of policy. Their co-operation was the more difficult since their natural leader, Thomas, Earl of Lancaster, was a man whose character was not at all unlike that of his cousin the king. More brutal, vicious, and capricious than Edward, Thomas resembled his kinsman in his laziness, his neglect of business, his wish to shuffle out of responsibility and in his habit of leaving all his affairs to be executed by the officers of his household. The consequence was that there was not only a king, who would not govern, but an opposition leader who could only oppose. In 1312, and again more completely after Bannockburn, the opposition became the government. Earl Thomas now showed himself even more incompetent than his cousin. He refused to govern ; he continued as victor to hold aloof from affairs, abiding in the same sulky isolation in which he had lived when he was in opposition. Consequently the failure of Thomas was even more complete than the failure of Edward. Hence the extraordinarily purposelessness of much of the politics of the reign, hence the long-drawn-out intrigues, negotiations, and threatenings of war that take up so much of the story of the chroniclers.

The real struggle was not so much between Edward and Thomas as between the organised households through which, like all mediæval magnates, the king and the earl governed their estates and exercised their political authority. And as between the two there can be no doubt but that the followers of the king were abler, more serious, and better organised than the followers of the earl. They showed great skill in setting the rival factions of the opposition against each other,

and in the end broke up its unity so completely that the king won an easy triumph. The two chief centres of aristocratic power were the North and the West, the lands beyond the Humber, and the Severn valley and the adjacent March of Wales, where the great struggles of the reign were fought out. In the early part of 1322 Edward first conquered his western enemies in a bloodless campaign in the Severn valley, and then turning northwards crushed Earl Thomas and his northern foes. When Lancaster was beheaded under the walls of his own castle of Pontefract, the royalist triumph was consummated, and from 1322 to 1326 the courtiers, inspired by the younger Despenser, ruled England in the king's name. A sanguinary proscription of the contrariant lords now followed. The baronial leaders lost in many cases life, or liberty, and in more cases their lands. Their abject helplessness gave Edward the best chance a mediæval sovereign ever had of making himself an autocrat. But once more the man in power was too incompetent to take advantage of his opportunity. The king, after a short spell of activity, soon fell back into his old ways. Before his sluggishness, indifference, and weakness, the best laid plans of his advisers could not be carried out. Their failure was the more complete since they pursued their own self interest with far more zeal and singleness of purpose than they strove to advance the welfare of the state. The fine schemes of ministers for consolidating the royal power and reforming the government were brought to naught by the intense greediness of the younger Despenser. During four years of isolation from power, the aristocracy had time to reconstitute itself, and the ignoble quarrel of the king and his queen brought about the crisis of 1326.

Isabella and her lover Mortimer landed in Suffolk with a handful of followers. But disgust of the ruling faction drove every one to their standards, the more so as the invaders were shrewd enough to pose as the champions of the outraged contrariants and the avenger of the wrongs of the Martyr of Pontefract. When Henry of Lancaster, the brother and heir of Earl Thomas, joined Isabella and Mortimer, he gave the signal for a general desertion of the king's cause. The king soon found himself powerless to resist the united opposition of the reconstituted baronage, backed up by the sympathy of the mass of the people. Before long even the ministerial rats began to leave the sinking ship. The very courtiers, who had been the chief agents of the

Despensers and the crown, the self-seeking bishops, who had wormed their way to their sees by truckling to the caprices of the king, went over almost as a body to the side whose victory seemed now to be certain. Edward fled to the West, accompanied by the Despensers, his chancellor, Robert Baldock, and a very few faithful followers. He soon found his own realm of England too hot to hold him. Unable to maintain himself at Gloucester, Edward fled beyond the Severn to the great marcher principality which the younger Despenser was erecting out of his wife's lordship of Glamorgan. As a last effort to maintain a foothold in England, the elder Despenser made his way back over the Severn to Bristol, where he at once met his doom. It was in Bristol town that the opposition leaders proclaimed that, as Edward II had openly withdrawn himself from the realm, leaving England without ruler or governance, his son Edward, Duke of Aquitaine, was chosen by the magnates as Keeper of the Realm. It was the first notice to the king that his barons were determined to put an end to his authority.

During the next few days Edward, after an unsuccessful attempt to escape to Lundy Island, wandered aimlessly through Glamorgan. Meanwhile Henry of Lancaster was commissioned to effect his capture, and soon, not without a suspicion of treachery, was successful in his quest. On 16 November, 1326, Edward and his comrades in misfortune were betrayed at Neath; and conveyed thence to Llantrissant. Within a few days Hugh the younger paid at Hereford the same fatal penalty that his father had paid at Bristol. Meanwhile Edward was escorted to Monmouth, where he surrendered the great seal, the symbol of sovereignty which he had hitherto retained, to his bitter enemy Adam Orleton, Bishop of Hereford.

We have now, at last, reached our real subject—the captivity and death of Edward II. The question at once arises whether, when we have recast so many of our judgments on the period, we may not with advantage review afresh the traditional story of the unhappy monarch's imprisonment, and in particular try once more to pierce the veil of mystery and legend which have obscured the story of his death. Now it may certainly be said that it is well worth our while to reconsider this story, to examine meticulously the evidence on which the account in our histories is based, and to try and fit in a few new but striking bits of testimony that have latterly been brought to light. To

perform this task is now my chief business, but though I may perhaps discharge a useful service in putting together the chief testimonies that bear on the story of the deposed king's last years, yet I may say at once that the result of this investigation is rather negative. It raises doubts ; it explains hesitations ; it gives some justification to those who believed that Edward did not meet a violent death in his prison. Above all, it discredits the only detailed narrative of the sufferings of the wretched king. But it does not shake our faith in the essential truth of the accepted story.

The history of the captivity of Edward II falls naturally into two stages. The first goes from his surrender on 16 November, 1326, to 4 April, 1327. During this period Henry of Lancaster, Earl of Leicester, was responsible for his custody, having been appointed to that charge with the informal approval of the barons. The details of the king's history during these months are fairly well known, and there is little suggestion of mystery about them, though there is plenty of pathos. Within a short time of the tragedy at Hereford, Edward was escorted to Henry of Lancaster's castle of Kenilworth where he remained as long as he continued under his care. During this period the formal stages of the revolution were accomplished. The barons had shown in dealing with the unpopular king a pedantic precision that well anticipates the stiff legalism of the revolution Whigs in their relations to James II in 1688. Their first position was that the king, by withdrawing himself from the realm, had compelled them to appoint a regent, and their choice of his eldest son as Keeper of the Kingdom showed their adhesion to the right line of descent. It is true that Edward of Carnarvon only withdrew himself for a few miles beyond the region where the king's writ ran, and that the lordship of Glamorgan was not foreign to any very impressive extent. But with Edward's forcible return to England this excuse might well seem to have been no longer plausible. This mattered the less since after the barons got possession of Edward's great seal, they could formally act in his name even when he was in their prison. Indeed it seemed to them the line of least resistance to pretend that Edward was still governing. This is best seen in the change in the form of the writs, issued so far back as October, for the assembling of a parliament. The original writs, tested by the young Edward, had stated that, in the king's absence from the realm, the business in parliament would be

dealt with by the queen and the duke, the Keeper of the Realm. But now that the great seal was in the possession of the victors, writs in the usual form were issued to supply the informality of the earlier ones. When parliament at last met on 7 January, at Westminster, it was resolved that Edward should be deposed for incompetence, and his son put in his place. But twice were deputations sent to Kenilworth to induce the king to meet parliament. The motive for this apparently was to extract from him a public resignation. The magnates shrank from the drastic course of deposition, which a few years earlier the nobles of Germany had adopted in the case of their incapable king, Adolf of Nassau. It would seem less revolutionary, and less disturbing to precedent, if Edward could be induced formally to divest himself of the office, which in any case he was no longer to be allowed to hold. But the captive of Kenilworth stubbornly refused to face parliament. As Edward would not meet parliament, parliament resolved that its representatives should meet Edward. A deputation of parliament visited Kenilworth, and Edward was offered the alternative of resignation or deposition. He showed little fight, and promptly accepted the inevitable. Clad in black, dazed with confusion, he was led before the deputies and announced with many tears that he would yield to the wishes of parliament and not stand in the way of his son's advancement. Then the proctor of the parliament renounced formally the fealty and homage which the individual members had made to the king. Finally the steward of the household broke his wand of office to indicate that the royal household was discharged. These things happened on 20 January. On their being related in London, the last stage of the revolution was consummated and Edward, Duke of Aquitaine, was definitely proclaimed as King Edward III. His regnal year was treated as beginning on 25 January.

Now that the pedantic pomps of his resignation were over, the chroniclers tell us little of the doings of Edward of Carnarvon at Kenilworth. In general terms we are informed that his treatment at the hands of his gaoler was good, and that he lacked nothing that a recluse or monk needed for his sustenance. This is likely enough, for Henry of Lancaster was a kindly gentleman, and, though he took a leading part in bringing about the king's deposition and was profoundly conscious of his brother's wrongs and of his own, he was not the man to treat with unnecessary harshness a captive entrusted to his

custody. But Henry soon began to have new grievances of his own. The leaders of the revolution had ostentatiously made the wrongs of Lancaster a pretext for their action. They had besought the pope to canonise the incompetent and disreputable Earl Thomas, and they had, as we have seen, given his more respectable brother the custody of the captive king. They had also—rather tardily—restored him to his brother's earldoms, so that we may henceforth call him Earl of Lancaster as well as Earl of Leicester. They had given him the first place in the standing council of regency which was to act in the name of the infant Edward III. Nevertheless Henry soon found that he had the show of power rather than its reality. Mortimer and the queen, not the Earl of Lancaster, really controlled the government. No sooner had the victorious coalition succeeded in establishing itself, than it began to show signs of breaking up. The moral of Edward II's reign is once more affirmed under his supplanter. It was easy for any strong combination of parties to seize the government of England. It was extremely difficult to retain for any long period the authority thus easily acquired.

Under these circumstances a natural reaction against the new government set in. It was equally natural that it should take the form of a wave of sympathy in favour of the deposed king. Soon partisans of Edward of Carnarvon were traversing the country, dilating upon his misfortunes and his sufferings. English public opinion veered in those days between extremes of brutality and extremes of sentimentality. It was normally callous enough, but from time to time it reacted in a contrary direction. It then became prone to show sympathy for fallen greatness, to pity misfortune, and to assume that the victim of fate was the champion of a good cause, the friend of the people. Thus the wretched Thomas of Lancaster was being acclaimed as a saint, not so much by partisans who wished to make profit by his deification as by simple-minded folk who easily persuaded themselves that a magnate, condemned to so cruel a fate, must surely have laid down his life for the English people or for the Church of God. A similar wave of emotion now arose on behalf of Edward of Carnarvon. Plots were formed for his release, and his custody became a real burden to Henry of Lancaster. The burden was the more serious since a projected campaign against Scotland required the presence of Earl Henry and most of the magnates to the North.

Under these circumstances the custody of Edward of Carnarvon was changed. A canon of Leicester, Henry Knighton, who wrote in a Lancastrian foundation in the Lancastrian interest, tells us that Earl Henry refused any longer to accept responsibility for the deposed king, because, as rumour declared, while the earl was employed elsewhere, some ancient partisans of his captive were weaving plots to abduct him from Kenilworth.¹ On the other side, it is possible that the government, feeling less confidence in Earl Henry, or wishful to have the old king under stricter, perhaps under less scrupulous, direction were not unwilling to dispense with his services. However that may be, the change was made, and on 3 April the care of Edward of Carnarvon was transferred to Thomas of Berkeley and John Maltravers. With this begins the second stage of Edward II's captivity, the stage of mystery and darkness, culminating in more than the suspicion of a tragic end. With this and its after results will be our chief concern on this occasion.

It now becomes necessary, before we proceed with our story, to scrutinise the authorities on which it is based. As everybody knows, the chief sources for mediæval history are chronicles and records. The former, narrative histories in essence, vary immensely in their authenticity, and a good deal, but not everything, depends upon whether or not they are contemporary or nearly contemporary to the events which they describe. The merit of the chronicler is that he gives us a consecutive story, that he often suggests character, motives, reasons, a point of view, and generally gives us contemporary colour. His demerit is that he writes loosely, frequently draws his information from sources of doubtful authority, is often ignorant and prejudiced, and sometimes deliberately aims at falsifying the facts. The merit of the record is that it is impersonal, official, contemporary, and based on knowledge. It is set down, too, in the records of an administrative or judicial court, and is preserved not to help historians or satisfy general curiosity, but to be of practical use to officials, judges, administrators, and other persons employed in the government of the country. But the record has its limitations as much almost as the chronicle, though they are different in kind. It is valuable as evidence of external facts, exact dates, names, costs, movements, and it shows us the

¹ Knighton, i. 444, R.S.

structure, personnel, and functions of the administrative machine. But it seldom throws light on the inner meaning of things ; it is colourless, arid, jejune ; it is largely taken up with common form, and though generally, bar human carelessness, based upon sound information, is liable to be falsified when the need arises. Under normal circumstances we can balance the chronicle and the record with each other, while correcting from the precision of the record, the mere gossip of the chronicler. In the light of the chronicle we can illuminate the dry facts of the record, combine them in some intelligible order, and give them colour and their proper setting.

Up to the transfer of Edward of Carnarvon from the custody of Henry of Lancaster to that of Berkeley and Maltravers, our information, though not very copious, is sufficient for our purpose, and there is no need to say from what source we learn this or that fact, since the whole story works together in substantial harmony. Perhaps the only doubt that has passed my mind in telling you the story in outline is as to certain picturesque details relating to the resignation of Edward, which would have been more picturesque had I the courage to tell you them in detail. These particulars came from the Chronicle of Geoffrey the Baker, a worthy as to whom I shall have later a good deal to say. At this stage I need only remark that, though much of Baker is suspicious, he quotes what seems good authority for this episode. It is the written evidence of an Oxfordshire knight, Sir Thomas de la Moor, who was himself present as a member of the household of Bishop Stratford of Winchester who took a leading part in the ceremony. This is worth remembering since the misunderstanding of Baker's reference to Moor's testimony has been misunderstood, last and not least by so great a scholar as Bishop Stubbs, as meaning that the whole of Baker's Chronicle was based on a French chronicle written by Moor. It is now agreed that this inference is illegitimate.

After April, 1327, our evidence becomes much scantier. We can barely trace the transference of the king's custody, the sum allowed for his maintenance, and a few insignificant details from the public records. There is more illustration of the condition of the country and of public opinion, as to which I shall have occasion to speak again. Moreover, the public records are partially supplemented from the private archives of the house of Berkeley, still largely, I believe, extant, but

mainly accessible through the seventeenth century tractate in which John Smith of Nibley, steward of the Berkeleys of that epoch, wrote his lives of the Berkeleys, which the Bristol and Gloucestershire Archæological Society has happily given to the world.¹ From these we learn various significant facts. But it is only after the king's death that the records give us abundant information as to his funeral, his lying-in-state, and ultimately the erection of his tomb. Again after 1330 there is some evidence preserved in the Rolls of Parliament as to the trials of his alleged murderers. The after careers of these suspects we can follow in abundant detail and with some profit from record sources. Even more scanty is the information of the chroniclers. If, as is unlikely, they knew the truth, they assuredly dared not tell it. Though several writers agree that the former king was murdered and even as to the method of his murder, their short accounts were written many years afterwards. The only circumstantial narrative, that of Baker, was written thirty years afterwards and is on the face of it highly suspicious.

The result of the conspiracy of silence was, as usual, a lack of faith in such scanty doles of information as were given out to the public. There was a general disbelief that Edward was really dead, and romantic stories arose in many quarters that he escaped and lived many years afterwards in obscurity. These stories, however fantastic, are natural under the circumstances. They are too corroborated by certain curious pieces of evidence. It is not unlikely that a more meticulous examination of the record sources may give some little further light on the problem. Some remarkable additions to the legend were made some forty years ago. Some very material new facts have been divulged within the last few years. But it is only after 1330 that we have copious references, not to the murder but to the fate of the alleged murderers. The fortunes of all these can be traced in detail, and what emerges from their history suggests some additional considerations as regards the problem of Edward II's end.

We start with the known fact that the custody of the deposed

¹ Smith or Smyth, *Lives of the Berkeleys*, 3 vols. Some conception of the wealth of the still surviving Berkeley Castle manuscripts can be obtained from Isaac H. Jeayes' *Descriptive Catalogue of the Charters and Muniments in the possession of Lord Fitzhardinge at Berkeley Castle*. Bristol, 1892.

king was vested in Berkeley and Maltravers from 3 April, and we know within a few days that an allowance of £5 a day was assigned to the two keepers "for the expenses of the household of the Lord Edward, sometime King of England, our father".¹ This was a liberal sum, larger, if we may trust a chronicler, than the sum allowed to Henry of Lancaster for keeping Edward at Kenilworth,² and approaching half the amount of Edward's domestic establishment in his youth before he had been made Prince of Wales. It would have given an ample margin both for maintaining the deposed king with a reasonable degree of state and for the adequate safeguarding of his person. If the captive were not generously entertained, it must have been because his keepers did not wish to treat him well, and perhaps because they regarded the allowance as a bribe to commit evil deeds.

It has often been suggested that Edward was deliberately handed over from kindly to unscrupulous keepers. Yet there is not much to encourage this idea, save inference from later facts. Perhaps the previous career of Thomas of Berkeley and John Maltravers suggests a little more malevolent hostility to their prisoner than Henry of Lancaster felt. But all three keepers were avowed enemies of the captive who in his days of power had inflicted grievous suffering upon them. Berkeley and Maltravers were members of that Lancastrian party of which Earl Henry had been the head. Henry's prudence had saved him from the dire fate of many of the contrariants, and he had condoned his brother's murder by accepting his personal liberty and a mere fragment of his inheritance from Edward II. But the other two had incurred forfeiture. Berkeley had shared the captivity of his father Maurice, and when the latter died in 1326 in confinement, he was still under duress. A Gloucestershire magnate of high position, he had forfeited the ancestral castle of Berkeley, over which Hugh Despenser now ruled. Indeed, the Berkeley lands, included, not only Berkeley, but Redcliffe and Bedminster with a commanding authority

¹ *Fœdera*, ii. 705, dated 24 April, Stamford. The issues of Glamorgan, still in the king's hands, were chargeable with the payment which was to be accounted for at the exchequer. Other moneys came from the treasure found at Caerphilly, when the son of the younger Despenser surrendered tardily that stronghold. Ultimately the exchequer took up the burden. The Berkeley household accounts show bountiful provision of wine, wax, capons, kids, eggs, cheese, cows, "ad hospicium patris regis": Jeayes, pp. 274-277.

² Baker, p. 28, gives 100 marks a month as the sum.

over the great mercantile borough of Bristol, which looked on the house of Berkeley as its chief enemy. The absorption of the estate in the Despenser lands would have given Hugh a position in Gloucestershire transcending that of the earls of Gloucester of the house of Clare. The arrival of Isabella in London had released him from his prison. He had followed the queen to Gloucester and thence to Bristol, and was rewarded by his restoration to Berkeley and his great estates in Southern Gloucestershire. But a stronger claim on the victors than his sufferings was the fact that he had married a daughter of Roger Mortimer. John Maltravers, the other keeper, was the son of a Dorsetshire baron who was still alive. He married Thomas of Berkeley's sister and was closely associated with his policy. Luckily for himself he had escaped in the rout of Boroughbridge and had managed to reach the Continent. He only returned in the train of Isabella and Mortimer. On the whole, then, the new keepers were likely to be a little more hostile than Earl Henry to their prisoner. It was in fact a sheer loss to Edward to be removed from the care of the most independent of the magnates to the custody of the son-in-law of the queen's paramour, associated with another dependent of Mortimer who was his own brother-in-law.

Already there had been, as we have said, rumours of plots for releasing Edward and procuring his return. It is possible that such schemes were already being hatched when the ex-king remained at Kenilworth, and the probability is increased by the fact that the chief agents of the plot, the brothers Dunhead, or Dunheved, had property and interests on Dunsmore, Warwickshire, between Kenilworth and Rugby. Of these brothers Stephen Dunhead had been lord of the manor of Dunchurch, near Rugby, but, forced to abjure the realm for felony in 1321, he strove to evade forfeiting it by demising it to a neighbouring baron.¹ His brother Thomas was a Dominican friar and an eloquent preacher, who, if chroniclers' gossip can be believed, had sought to get a divorce between Edward and Isabella from the papal curia.² On his return from this vain quest, Friar Thomas found his former master deposed and in prison, and at once strove to procure his release. As dates are almost lacking, we cannot exactly place the beginnings of this conspiracy, but it must have been when Edward was still at Kenil-

¹ *C. Fine R.*, iii. 185.

² *Ann. Paulini*, p. 337, "ut vulgariter dicebatur".

worth, and it soon spread its ramifications far and wide. Mediæval society was always excessively disorderly, but a special epidemic of violent crime ushered in the spring of 1327, and was doubtless the result of the recent revolution and the weak and partisan spirit of the administration which the revolution had established in power. To remedy this the chancery issued an enormous number of special commissions to hear and determine various deeds of violence, and strengthened the law for the purpose. Among the riotous acts thus dealt with was a violent assault on a country parson near Cirencester, to punish which a special commission was appointed. Among the suspected persons Stephen Dunhead is the first to be mentioned.¹ But he certainly was not caught then, for in May we find another order for his arrest and imprisonment in Wallingford Castle.² This also miscarried, for early in June he and his brother were in Cheshire, where they were at the head of a gang of "malefactors" who had "assembled within the city of Chester and parts adjacent" and were perpetrating "homicides and other crimes".³ But though the justice of Chester was besought to lay hands upon these criminals, they managed to escape his grip. A little later they were hiding again on Dunsmore, but they were certainly not captured there, as a chronicler thought. By this time they turned their operations southward, for they must have known that Edward had been transferred from Kenilworth to Berkeley, and their chief objective was ever his release from his captivity. But they were shrewd enough to make their own any grievance that appealed to the local rioter, and a fresh cause of complaint now arose in an unpopular expedition against the Scots and the compulsory levying of soldiers for the Scots' war, even in those midland and southern counties whose levies were seldom called upon to serve so far away from their homes.

Under such circumstances there is small blame to the government for having taken measures to put the captive king under custodians in whom the ministers could rely, and who would under no circumstances be exposed to the temptation of taking up his cause as a good weapon for breaking down the power of Mortimer and the queen. For such a purpose Mortimer's son-in-law and that son-in-law's brother were safer gaolers than Henry of Lancaster, with his scruples, his pretensions,

¹ *C.P.R.*, 1327-30, p. 80.

² *Ibid.*, p. 99.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 153. Mandate to justice of Chester of 8 June.

and his growing discontent against a government that had used him as a catpaw. It was equally natural that, as soon as the keepership of the late king was transferred from Lancaster to Berkeley and Maltravers, he should be put in some place better under government control than the Lancastrian castle of Kenilworth. That Lancaster himself did not want the worry and expense of his cousin's keeping made his transference all the easier. Accordingly, as soon as the new custody began, Edward was privately removed from Kenilworth and surrounded by a strong escort, covered a journey of over fifty miles in two days, quite good travelling for the fourteenth century. On the night of 5 April, which was also Palm Sunday, the ex-king reached Gloucester. He spent the night at Llantony Abbey, hard by the town, as the guest of the Austin canons of that house.¹ Next day he completed the easy journey to Berkeley. It is probable that efforts were made to keep his destination secret; it is most unlikely that this hasty flight of an armed force could have escaped the notice of a country-side, swarming with Edwardian partisans and sympathisers. Anyhow the plots redoubled in violence, and within two months of the transfer, the conspirators devoted their main energies to Berkeley and its neighbourhood. Let us see the sequel.

In the mass of seething discontent, no district was more disturbed than the lower valley of the Severn. The proximity of the March of Wales, always in extreme disorder; the local revolution worked by the fall of Despenser, in fact if not in name earl of Gloucester, and the further changes consequential on the restoration of the Berkeleys to their old position, were all potent factors of confusion. It was natural under such circumstances that the government should look to the lord of Berkeley and Redcliffe for help. Accordingly even before his formal pardon, still more before his appointment as the deposed king's keeper, Thomas of Berkeley had already been called upon to give his powerful aid in maintaining order in Gloucestershire and the adjacent districts. Thus on 8 March he was one of the two commissioners of the peace for Gloucestershire appointed in accordance with the recent Act for the greater preservation of the peace.² Other and greater responsibilities followed, and the presence of the king at Berkeley did not prevent its lord's full employment as the local agent of

¹ *Ann. Paulini*, p. 333.

² *C.P.R.*, 1327-30, p. 89: The Act was 1 Edward III, sec. 2, cap. 16.

the authorities. The Scottish expedition and the local resistance to it gave a good excuse for heaping new powers on Berkeley, with whom Maltravers is now almost always associated. Thus the local magistrates were called on 30 April to aid the brothers-in-law "whom the king is sending to his castle of Bristol for arms and armour to be used in the northern parts".¹ On 3 July Berkeley was remitted his service against the Scots because he was "charged with special business of the king".² Finally, the two were on 11 July put on a commission of the peace pursuant to the Statute of Winchester, in the seven neighbouring counties of Dorset, Somerset, Hereford, Wilts, Hants, Oxon, and Berks.³ Thus they received executive authority all over the middle south-west. Moreover, as this work, and their own affairs,⁴ kept them, we imagine, away from Berkeley, an experienced king's clerk, John Walwayn, doctor of law, himself a West Country man, who had held the great post of treasurer and the important office of escheator, but who apparently was thought inadequate for the highest positions, was sent down to Berkeley to look after things there.

It was high time, for by July a curious conspiracy had been formed in which men of different regions and strangely varied professions and walks of life banded themselves together, ostensibly to resist service against the Scots, really, as we shall see, for a much more dangerous object. There were Gloucestershire men and Worcester-shire men ; there were men from Warwickshire and men from Staffordshire ; there were high and low, laymen and clerks, and among the latter, parish priests, preaching friars, Benedictine monks and Austin canons. There was a canon of Llantony, who perhaps had been smitten with compassion for the deposed monarch who had passed Palm Sunday night within his house. There was a monk of the great foundation of Hales ; above all there were the brothers Stephen and Thomas Dunhead, still free to conspire and lead rebellions, despite a whole row of orders for their arrest.⁵ It was a formidable crowd, and

¹ *C.P.R.*, 1327-30, p. 95.

² *Ibid.*, p. 130.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 154.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 130, shows Maltravers pardoned for acquiring an estate in Wiltshire without license and authorised to hold the same.

⁵ The presence of the Dunheads here shows the inaccuracy of *Ann. Paulini*, p. 337, which states that Thomas had been captured "about 11 June," "apud Bidebrok prope Dunmor" (that is, of course, in Warwickshire), imprisoned at Pontefract, and, failing to escape, thrown down a well and perished. But I think the *Annals* chief error is in dating this too early.

there was no strong force available in these days to deal with a sudden rebellion.

Chance has lately shown us that this conspiracy of the Dunheads attained, at least for a moment, the object of all its efforts. That an attempt was made has long been known by a mandate on the Patent Rolls ordering Berkeley, as a chief keeper of the peace in Gloucestershire, to arrest the Dunheads and their followers "indicted before him for coming with an armed force to Berkeley castle to plunder it and for refusing to join the king in his expedition against the Scots".¹ But a few years ago, a French scholar, Dr. Tanqueray of St. Andrews, unearthed in the Public Record Office and published in the *English Historical Review*² a letter of John Walwayn, written on 27 July from Berkeley Castle to the chancellor, which tells us much more than this. It tells thus that a long list of people, almost, but not quite, the same as those indicted before Berkeley, has been indicted before Walwayn; that Walwayn is doubtful whether he has authority under his commission, and prays the chancellor to ordain an immediate remedy. But it also lets the cat out of the bag. A confidential letter to the chancellor had no reason to deal so discreetly with the truth as the letter patent, open to all the world to read, which the chancery issued, as we have seen, soon after the receipt of this secret despatch. Accordingly Walwayn does not scruple to say plainly that "the culprits indicted before him were charged with having come violently to the castle of Berkeley, with having ravished the father of our lord the king out of our guard, and with having feloniously robbed the said castle against the king's peace." Here is a bit of new information of a startling kind. Within three months of his establishment in Berkeley, a conspiracy to release the old king attained at least a temporary success. The confederates seized the castle and plundered it; they rescued Edward of Carnarvon from his dungeon.

No wonder under these circumstances that the policy of silence and concealment, already adopted as regards the imprisoned king, should be carried out with tenfold rigour than before; that the public records should contain no reference to this tremendous fact; that the chroniclers should in very fear show a compulsory discretion, and that

¹ *C.P.R.*, 1327-30, pp. 156-7. This is dated 1 August, at Stanhope, Durham.

² *English Historical Review*, xxxi. 119-24 (1916).

the subsequent career of the unlucky captive should be severely cut short, but after so secret a fashion that a doubt should remain, strong at the time, weaker as years rolled on, as to what fate befell the hapless Edward. Some of these points I must recur to later on : but at present I may record as my conviction, though I do not claim it as more than a judgment based on probabilities, that Edward was very soon recaptured and restored to his prison, and that to save further risk he was quietly done to death some three months later.

Before we approach the final problem, it may be suggested that this proved escape of Edward from Berkeley gives us a clue towards interpreting the two chroniclers who profess to know most about the last adventures of the deposed king. The first of these, Adam Murimuth, a canon of St. Paul's, wrote his history in its final form soon after the time of the battle of Crecy, some eighteen years after these events. But we have internal evidence that he wrote the passages describing Edward II's fate before 1345, because he tells us that Maltravers was still abroad and we shall learn that he was allowed to return to England in that year.¹ After telling us that Edward had been taken to Berkeley in secret "about Palm Sunday" he goes on as follows :—

"And because they were afraid of certain persons coming to him to effect his release, Edward was secretly removed from Berkeley by night, and taken to Corfe and other secret places, but at last they took him back to Berkeley, but after such a fashion that it could hardly be ascertained where he was."²

Murimuth was an intelligent man, accustomed to affairs, associated with the great, and wise enough to be circumspect, though desirous of telling the truth. This passage, interpreted in the light of our knowledge of Edward's escape, suggests that his "secret removal" from Berkeley was the result of the conspirators' temporary success, and that his subsequent wanderings both preceded and succeeded his recapture, and resulted in his being in the end brought back to his ancient place of confinement. I do not for a moment suggest that Murimuth was aware of the carefully guarded secret of Edward's escape : but he did know what all men knew of the notorious attempts to effect his release, and he intelligently connected these with

¹ Murimuth, pp. 52-54, R.S.

² *Ibid.*, p. 52.

the removal of the old king to Corfe, and other hiding places, and with his subsequent return to Berkeley.

We are now in a position to appreciate the only detailed account of Edward's captivity, that written after 1356 by Geoffrey Baker. Much of it is mere rhetoric, word-painting, and abuse, for Baker was far from being above the crime of "making copy," so hated by the discreet editor and yet so universally practised. When Baker gets to facts, and we can compare him with our other sources of knowledge, we can prove him to be wrong. Thus, beginning with the events of April, he tells us that Edward was put under the custody of Thomas Gurney and John Maltravers, ignoring the fact that the chief keeper was so respectable a nobleman as Thomas Berkeley. He tells a long and demonstrably false story how the king when he was led from Kenilworth was taken first to Corfe, then to Bristol, whence when discovered by the burgesses he was taken by dead of night to Berkeley. He tells us the indignities suffered by him on the way; how his cruel tormentors crowned him with a crown of hay, clothed him with insufficient garments, forced him to ride through the night with uncovered head, fed him on food so nauseous that it made him sick; how they shaved his beard and hair that he might less readily be recognised, and how the suffering Edward warmed with his tears cold water that the barber was compelled to use, how, in short, he endured things that clearly proved that God had marked him out for the crown of martyrdom. These stories he relates as told him over twenty years later by one William Bishop, leader of the captive's guard, a personage whom authentic history certainly cannot distinguish from his various namesakes of this period.

I suggest that Murimuth's story gives the modest nucleus of truth that was elaborated with Baker's picturesque romance. What we now know of the temporary release of Edward further illuminates this point of view. We may feel sure that the crowd under the Dunheads did not keep together long after their opening success.¹ But the duty of its dispersion must have fallen upon Berkeley, as the head of the local administration established for the emergency in the Western shires. It was Berkeley who was to indict the offenders, to press the

¹ Stephen Dunhead was arrested in London before 1 July, 1327, but escaped, and was still wandering at large in 1329. *C.C.R.*, 1327-30, pp. 146 and 549.

hue and cry after them, and imprison their leaders. In this process he was careful to charge the plotters, not with their real offence of abducting the deposed king but with the more commonplace crimes of an attempt to plunder Berkeley and of refusing to undertake military service against the Scots. But the conspiracy of silence obscured the truth for contemporaries even more than for us. One result of Berkeley's activity was doubtless the recapture of Edward, and we may well believe that, as part of the stage management of the mystery, he was hurried to various hiding-places, including perhaps Corfe. But he was certainly brought back to Berkeley. And as one result of Berkeley's administrative duties he was compelled, we may guess, to delegate to others personal custody of Edward. One result of this process was the that the sinister presence of Sir Thomas Gurney now comes upon the scene. This Somersetshire knight, becomes, as Berkeley's deputy, the colleague of Maltravers.

We now come to the final stage of Edward's troubles. Of this Baker and Baker only gives a circumstantial account. He tells us that the queen, not unreasonably, we may add, from the point of view of her own safety, thought that the time was now come when her husband must die, and that Adam Orleton, bishop of Hereford, her special confidant, who played the part of the chief villain of the piece, wrote a sealed letter to that effect to his keepers, couched in ambiguous terms that could be interpreted differently according to its punctuation. The hint of murder was conveyed if it read "It is a good thing not to be afraid to kill Edward," but the alternative meaning "It is a good thing to be afraid to kill Edward," might well be brought forward if the message fell into wrong hands.

This is clearly a bit of fiction. It is improbable on the face of it. Even wicked bishops hesitate to send written orders to kill deposed kings, and to plead the accident of a wrong interpretation if their note miscarries. Moreover, at this period Orleton was far from being, as Baker suggests, constantly at the side of the guilty queen. In fact, he had left England for the papal court at Avignon so early as March, when Edward was still at Kenilworth, and did not return from Avignon until after it had been given out at Berkeley that the late king was dead. Moreover, before news of that event could have reached the Pope, John XXII had appointed Orleton by papal provision bishop of Worcester, and this acceptance of promotion involved him

in a fierce conflict with the English crown which had approved of the election by the monastic chapter of Worcester of their prior, Wolfstan of Bransford. In the event the pope prevailed over king and chapter and Orleton became bishop of Worcester, and therefore the diocesan of both Berkeley and Gloucester. It is a fair illustration of the wildness of Baker's guesses that he should make Orleton responsible for an act, which he could not have inspired, at a moment when he was quarrelling with queen and council because they resisted an attempt to make him bishop of the diocese where the crime was perpetrated. No doubt Orleton was a self-seeking ruffian, and there is no reason to accept the suggestion of the recent editor of his Hereford register that because he kept his official records like a good man of business, he was probably a good man. But whatever crimes we may lay to his charge, he did not write a letter urging ambiguously the murder of his ancient monarch. In later years his fiercest enemies never brought that accusation against him. His *alibi* was too clearly proved.

But if Orleton claims a right to be acquitted, circumstances have recently come to light which seem to throw the responsibility for ending Edward of Carnarvon's mortal career on Mortimer himself. The revolution of 1326 had established Mortimer in the position of justice of Wales, held so long by his uncle Roger Mortimer of Chirk. His preoccupations in England gave him little time for exercising in person his duties as justice of Wales, and he ruled North Wales through his lieutenant, William of Shalford. But the Welsh, who had loved Edward of Carnarvon, regretted his fate the more since his fall had restored the rule of a Mortimer over them, and to the Welsh the government of the greatest of the marcher lords was the worst form of tyranny. In 1321-2 a rising in North Wales had made it easier for Edward as king to overthrow the Mortimer power and re-establish his position. What had happened once might well occur again, and it looks as if some of the very Welsh magnates who had followed Sir Gruffydd Llwyd in his earlier attack on the Mortimers were now once more plotting a similar movement. By August, 1327, when the English conspiracies to release Edward had mainly died out, a Welsh conspiracy to effect the same end seems to have been organised. The leader of this movement was a South Welsh knight, Sir Rhys ap Gruffydd, who acted apparently at the instigation of certain English magnates, and with the active support of the leading men of

both North and South Wales.¹ We know nothing for certain of the success which attended his efforts. It was, however, enough to excite the alarm of William of Shalford, Mortimer's lieutenant. Accordingly on 7 September, 1327, Shalford wrote to his chief telling him that Sir Rhys and his comrades had formed their plot and that there was real danger, that Edward might be released from Berkeley, and that the only thing for Roger was to ordain a "suitable remedy" to prevent himself and his party from being utterly undone. Shalford's letter reached Mortimer at Abergavenny, and it was believed in North Wales that it induced him to make the fatal decision that the only way of saving his power and his life, was to put Edward forthwith to death. Consequently, Mortimer sent a dependent of his, William Ogle, or Ockley, from Abergavenny to Berkeley, taking with him Shalford's letter, and hinting not obscurely to Maltravers and Gurney what was the obvious remedy to ease the situation.

With the arrival of Ogle the last phase of Edward of Carnarvon's misfortunes began. He was now allowed but a short shrift, for within a fortnight of the date of the fatal letter, written by Shalford, it was officially announced that the "king's father" had died on 21 September. Gurney and Maltravers had doubtless already made up their mind how to act. The arrival of Ogle on the scene brought things to a crisis.

The judicial proceedings taken three years later, feeble and futile though they were, make it clear that these three men, Gurney, Maltravers, and Ogle were looked upon as the direct agents of Edward of Carnarvon's death. Let us put together what little we learn from other sources as to the facts of the case. Firstly, let us interrogate the chroniclers.

We find that most of the chroniclers, though often a day or so wrong, substantially confirm the official statement as to the fact that Edward died on or about 21 September. They are, however, cautious about expressing themselves about the manner of his death and very reticent about details. The most nearly contemporary, the *Annals of St. Paul's*, simply say that the king died at Berkeley.² The north-country Chronicle of Lanercost suggests without confirming a suspi-

¹ For the authorities on which this paragraph is based, see Appendix.

² *Ann. Paulini*, p. 337.

cion.¹ Another northern writer prudently remarks : " With regard to the king's decease various opinions were commonly expressed. I prefer for myself to say no more about the matter, for sometimes, as the poet says, lies are for the advantage of many and to tell the whole truth does harm."² Murimuth, writing a little later with the *Annals of St. Paul's* before him, carries us somewhat further. After mentioning that the king " died " he adds, " And though many persons, abbots, priors, knights, burgesses of Bristol and Gloucester, were summoned to view his body, and indeed superficially examined it, nevertheless it was commonly said that he was slain as a precaution by the orders of Sir John Maltravers and Sir Thomas Gurney".³ The exact manner of the king's death comes later. We find it in Higden's *Polychronicon*,⁴ where testimony is of some importance since it was done into English by John Trevisa, Vicar of Berkeley, at a time when Thomas of Berkeley was still alive, and the translator would not have lightly adopted such a suggestion against his patron's honour. Moreover, the Lancastrian Chronicle of Knighton repeats the charge,⁵ and a Westminster monk not only reiterates it, but says that it was known not only to rumour but by the confession of the guilty parties.⁶

The amplification of the horrid story, briefly suggested some twenty years or less after the event, is found in Baker, and in Baker only. He tells us how up to the time of the receipt of Orleton's ambiguous letter, Thomas of Berkeley had treated the fallen king with kindness. But Baker's suggestion that Berkeley was only " lord of the castle " and not also the gaoler responsible for the king's keeping indicates an economy in dealing with truth that might give offence to a powerful nobleman in the next county. This story of Edward's kind treatment by Berkeley is otherwise confirmed. But now, says Baker, Berkeley was denied all relations with his victim. Thereupon, irritated that he was no longer master in his own house, Berkeley bade a sorrowful farewell to Edward and betook himself elsewhere. Unfortunately the Berkeley household accounts show that Thomas went no farther than

¹ *Chron. de Lanercost*, p. 260.

² *Gesta Edwardi tertii auctore Bridlingtonensi*, pp. 97-98.

³ Murimuth, pp. 54-55.

⁴ *Polychronicon*, viii., 324 : " Cum veru ignito inter celanda confossus. See also *Cont. Hemingburgh*, ii., 297-8.

⁵ Knighton, i. 446.

⁶ *Chron. J. de Reading*, ed. Tait, p. 78.

Bradley, his manor near Wotton-under-Edge, some six or seven miles away. I have already suggested that the local disturbances must have taken Thomas further afield ; but this particular absence at Bradley only took place on Michaelmas Eve, eight days after Edward's reputed death. No great confirmation of Baker's testimony can be extracted from this.

Let us return to Baker. No sooner was Thomas removed from his own castle than the slow murder of the helpless king began. He was confined in a room made pestilential by the stench of decaying bodies. But as his immense strength saved him from death, he was brutally murdered by night, as he lay in his bed, in a fashion that concealed exterior traces of wounds. Already his piteous complaints had informed carpenters, working outside the castle, of his tortures in the prison chamber ; now hideous shrieks told town and castle of his violent doom and drove many to their knees to pray for his soul.

Dismissing for the moment the crucial difficulty of the king's end, let us tell from authentic records the history of his remains. From 21 September to 21 October, the body of the king remained at Berkeley, under Berkeley and Maltravers' custody, for which service they continued in receipt of their £5 per diem, "for the custody of the body". During this time, if we may believe the historian of Gloucester Abbey, the royal corpse was offered to various local monasteries, but the Austin canons of St. Augustines at Bristol, the modern cathedral, the Cistercians of St. Mary's at Kingswood, and the Benedictines of St. Aldhelm's at Malmesbury refused this dangerous honour "through fear of Mortimer and Queen Isabella". It is suggested that it was something of an act of heroism that John Thoky, Abbot of Gloucester, consented to receive the body. Thoky, in his own chariot, "nobly adorned with the arms of Gloucester Abbey," conducted it to his convent, where it was "honourably received by the whole community and with all the city in procession". This history, generally attributed to Abbot Frocester,¹ was finally put together in the early fifteenth century, and contemporary records show that nearly every particular statement in it is inexact. There was certainly no "fear of the queen and Mortimer" to deter the neighbouring abbey from accepting the charge of the king's body, for the government took up responsibility from the

¹ It is printed in vol. i. of Hart's *Historia et Cartularium Monasterii Sancti Petri Gloucestriæ*, 3 vols., R.S. 1863-7.

first, and warned by Sir Thomas Gurney of Edward's death,¹ at once published the news to the parliament which was then assembled at Lincoln. Indeed, the whole administration was then in the North, intent on the parliament sitting at Lincoln at the moment of the king's death and afterwards on the campaign and the negotiations with the Scots. The delay in dealing with the king's body is satisfactorily explained by the remoteness of the court from the Severn valley. As soon as it was possible to act, special arrangements were made for the care of the remains of the king's father. From this point the royal ministers, not Berkeley or the Gloucester monks, assumed the chief responsibility. When the body was removed to Berkeley, it was placed in the hands of officers appointed for the purpose. It is clear from the accounts of these officers that Gloucester represents the government's deliberate choice, and that the expenses of the removal of the body thither were at the charge of the state and not of the abbot. If Thoky sent his "chariot" for the body, the odds are that he got paid for the service he rendered. Anyhow Berkeley charged the crown for many of the expenses of the removal. He put down to the crown account the cost of dyeing black the canvass that covered the hearse, of the cords and the traces of the horses, the expenses of taking the body to Gloucester, and those of his household which accompanied it, of the vase of silver in which Edward's heart was enclosed, and of the oblations in the masses in the castle chapel for the soul of the dead king.² Then Berkeley and Maltravers gave up their charge when the body had reached Gloucester. And of the money that was owed them for the 201 days of their custody the exchequer was still over £300 in arrears when the account was made up.³

The whole business was from this point regulated by ordinances of king and council, and a new set of accounts shows in detail the elaborate arrangements made for the custody of the body as long as it remained above ground. The see of Worcester being vacant or dis-

¹ He was sent to the king when Edward III was at Nottingham, and allowed 31s. 1d. expenses: Smith, *Lives of the Berkeleys*, i. 293. The king arrived at Nottingham on 30 September. Compare Jeayes' *Catalogue*, p. 274, " . . . de Gourne eunti apud Notyngham pro morte patris regis regi et regine notificanda cum litteris domini". The "dominus" was, of course, Thomas of Berkeley.

² Smith, i. 293.

³ *Archæologia*, i., 223.

puted, the neighbouring bishop of Llandaff was instructed to remain at Gloucester till the funeral, and received 13s. 4d. a day for his expenses for the fifty-nine days which he devoted to that object. This prelate, John Eaglescliff, was a Dominican friar, forced on Llandaff by the pope in 1323 in despite of king and chapter, and we may charitably assume that one element in his selection was that he belonged to an order which Edward II had always regarded with special favour and from which he had chosen his confessors. Besides the bishop, two knights, at 6s. 8d. a day, and 5s. respectively, were also ordered to be in attendance. To them two royal chaplains, two sergeants-at-arms, and the king's *candelarius* were added. A third sergeant-at-arms, already at Berkeley when the captive died, was also retained, while a royal clerk, Hugh of Glanville, was assigned to pay the expenses of the whole business. Put cynically, we may say that just as secrecy had been the game of the government up to St. Matthew's day, so now a public exhibition of almost excessive respect seems to have been thought the most desirable policy.

The funeral was delayed for two more months. The main reason was the impossibility of the king and court attending in person until the Scottish business was more or less settled. Another was the extreme dispersion of the directing and spending departments. The court and council were wandering over Yorkshire, Lincolnshire, and Nottinghamshire, and with them went the wardrobe, the source of household expenditure. But the exchequer, the chief source of national financial expenditure, was then stationed at York, and the great wardrobe, the department of stores, from which came most of the apparatus necessary for the funeral, was permanently established in London. It was no wonder then that there was so long a delay, and the detailed accounts of the keeper of the great wardrobe show how nobly the funeral was conducted. There was an immense display of goldleaf; there were leopards emblazoned on the harness of the horses; there was the hearse, with great golden lions, provided by the king's painter, and effigies of the evangelists standing upon it. There were angels censuring with gold censers; there were knights in attendance with new robes provided at the king's expense; there was a wooden image of the dead king, worth 40s. and a copper-gilt crown upon its head worth 7s. 3d. There were great beams of oak provided to keep back the crowd that thronged to have a glimpse of

the royal corpse.¹ There were heavy charges for the painful dispatch of all these paraphernalia by road from London to Gloucester. There was a full attendance of mourners, including the not very disconsolate widow and the son, the young king who had supplanted him. Everything was done in decency and order, so that we may take for what it is worth the rash statement of chroniclers that the funeral was but a hugger-mugger affair. There was even a pretence at inquiry, for it seems that the woman employed in embalming the body was sent to attend the court to Worcester immediately after the ceremony, that she might give Isabella what light she could as to the circumstances of her husband's end. Then the court went back to the North where the king married his bride, met his parliament, and concluded the "disgraceful peace" with the Scots. There was no more allowed to be said about his father until the question was reopened three years later when the *coup d'état* of the young Edward III at Nottingham drove Mortimer from power to the scaffold, and relegated Isabella not to a dungeon, as the old histories tell us, but to a dignified, free, and luxurious retirement in which she lived to sixty-six, a good old age for those times, and died at last in 1368 in something like the odour of sanctity.

One other observation only need be made as to the period of the regency and that is that the men whom common report associated with the crime, Berkeley, Maltravers and Sir Thomas Gurney remained trusted agents of Mortimer and Isabella. Maltravers in particular was raised to a great position, for between 1328 and 1330 he acted as steward of the king's household, the lay head of the royal establishment, and therefore—we may guess—in a position to prevent any compromising documents appearing in the wardrobe accounts in which his clerical colleague, the treasurer of the wardrobe, recorded the expenses of the court. He had, however, vacated that office before the Nottingham catastrophe, though he still, I imagine, was in the confidence of the Queen Isabella.

Under these circumstances we may well believe that Edward was murdered at Berkeley. It is unlikely that this vigorous and healthy man of forty-three died a natural death. There is every probability that his unscrupulous enemies killed him "as a precaution". It was

¹ Pro claustrum circum corpus regis ad resistendum oppressionem populi irruentis.

always so with dangerous captives from the dawn of history. It was pre-eminently so in the middle ages. Our own history is full of such examples, Arthur of Brittany, Edward II, Thomas and Humphrey of Gloucester, Richard II, Henry VI, the princes in the Tower—leaving out the more respectable cases of pretenders slain in hot blood after a fight. Their ends were always mysterious; the official version generally savoured of the incredible; the probabilities pointed to violence; and there was always the chance to accuse either the supplanter, who had most to gain, or his inferior agents who generally did his dirty work for him. But in no case is there certain evidence of how the deed was done or as to the person doing it. The inevitable result of such an end is the suspicion of murder, and there is little reason for us departing from the commonplace attribution of the crime to those who profited most by it. From this point of view we may agree with the chroniclers that Isabella and Mortimer had the primary responsibility for this deed. But they were shrewd enough to obscure the evidence of their complicity, and there is little evidence even against the underlings who perpetrated the actual crime.

Under such circumstances there arose an impression that, after all, the victim might have escaped. All through history there are men, generally denounced as impostors, who claimed that they had marvelously evaded the doom allotted to them and demanded restitution to their ancient dignities. Instance of this range from the false Smerdis whom we read about in Herodotus to the false Demetrius, whose challenge to the throne of the Tsars is familiar to all students of the modern Russian opera. In English history the familiar instances are the "mammet of Scotland," whose claim to be Richard II was officially recognised by our Scottish enemies, and Perkin Warbeck, whose representation of himself as Richard, Duke of York, was widely accepted both in his own day and since. Now there was exceptional reason, far more than in most of the analogous cases I have mentioned, for believing that Edward II escaped the doom allotted to him at Berkeley, and, though no notorious claimant to his name ever presented himself, we can trace for the best part of a generation how the uncertainty of his fate moved men's minds and, as long as his enemies still ruled the land, how deliberate action based on the belief in his survival, stirred up men to deeds of daring and violence.

At first there was general scepticism as to Edward's fate, and we

can understand this better, now we know that he actually did for a time escape from his dungeon. But it is a remarkable thing that a large number of wise and influential people, and also some neither wise nor influential, profoundly believed that Edward was still alive. Among the latter we may safely class Edward's stupid and unpopular half-brother Edmund, Earl of Kent, whose disgust of Mortimer and Isabella led him into several half-hearted attempts against their administration. But the important thing is that so many of the better sort were impressed by the same rumour. Among these were the excellent Archbishop Melton of York, who had served him from youth up to the end; Bishop Gravesend of London, quite a respectable prelate; many Dominican friars on whom the mantle of Thomas Dunhead had fallen; some representatives of the official class, past and future; magnates who belonged to the court following, including Isabella's kinsman, Henry Beaumont; Scottish enemies of the realm; new and uncertain friends in France, and, strangest of all, the strong and masterful pope, John XXII, one of the greatest lawyers who ever sat on the papal throne. The Dunhead tradition still lingered. Thomas may have been dead, but one chronicler, Lanercost, believed that he was alive and was the preaching friar who convinced Kent of his brother's existence by conjuring up the devil to give testimony to that effect.¹ Even his brother Stephen escaped from gaol and was hard at work up to 1329. Unluckily we still have to move warily, for our chief information as to the development of this new phase of the sentiment of belief in Edward's remaining alive comes from a confession of Edmund of Kent, himself, whose stupidity and credulity make him a poor witness, even though he tried to tell the truth. Besides this Mortimer got wind of Kent's suspicions, and used some of his followers as *agents provocateurs* to lure the silly earl to his ruin. It is hard to know from Kent's story which of the officials were *bona fide* believers in Edward's existence and which were suborned to give false testimony. But we may readily assume that Maltravers, then steward of the household, was of the latter class. Anyhow Kent was involved in a net of treason from which abject confession afforded him no escape. With his execution in March,

¹ Lanercost (p. 265), who summarises Kent's confession from Murimuth (p. 253), identifies Thomas Dunhead with Kent's anonymous devil-invoking friar.

1330, the chief attempt to translate into action the belief that Edward still lived came to an end.

Another reason that suggests scepticism as to Edward of Carnarvon's murder is the extreme tenderness with which the suspected murderers were treated when in the Westminster Parliament of November, 1330, Mortimer and his chief abettors were tried and condemned. It is remarkable how small a place the death of Edward of Carnarvon took in the charges brought against them. It is true that Mortimer was declared guilty, among other counts, of having caused "the father of the lord king" to be murdered, but there were many other hanging matters brought up against him. Of those against whom common fame, then or later, brought direct charges of actually slaying Edward, two only, Sir Thomas Gurney and William Ogle, were convicted of "falsely and traitorously murdering the king's father," but both of these escaped their doom by flight. Ogle's share in the crime has up to lately been obscure, but recently a bright ray of new light has been flashed upon it. To this we shall soon recur. A third culprit, Simon Barford, was executed, but on other counts than the Berkeley murder. A fourth, Maltravers, was also condemned to death, but he, too, was arraigned on the very different charge of compassing the death of Edmund of Kent by persuading him that the old king was alive when he knew very well that he was dead. He, like Gurney and Ogle, escaped his fate by a speedy flight beyond seas. Thomas of Berkeley was dealt with most tenderly of all. Brought before parliament to explain how it happened that the lord Edward should have been suffered to be murdered in his castle and in his custody, he denied all responsibility. He had appointed Gurney and Ogle as his agents, having complete confidence in them. At the time of the murder he was lying sick at Bradley, miles away, and was too ill to have any memory of what had happened. Moreover, he only learnt in the present parliament that the late king had been murdered. Later a jury of knights appeared with Thomas in open parliament, and acquitted him of the chief charges brought against him.

Some of Berkeley's statements are plainly untrue. It looks as if his own household accounts disprove his absence from Berkeley; they certainly show he only got to Bradley more than a week later than Edward's reputed death. It is most improbable that he was so simple as never to have heard that his captive was supposed to have been

murdered, until nearly three years after the event. But parliament accepted him at his word, and ordered him to appear in the next parliament to answer the sole charge which it regarded as still requiring to be met, namely, his responsibility for the appointment of Gurney and Ogle by whom the king had been murdered. He was committed to the custody of the steward of the household. In the next parliament the case was still postponed, but, on the petition of the magnates, Berkeley was released from his bail. The business dragged on for nearly seven years. Even when parliament pronounced him guiltless of the murder, it still referred to the king's judgment whether any culpability was attached to him for so horrible a deed happening in his castle and involving a victim entrusted to his charge. At last, on 16 March, 1337, Edward III declared his complete acquittal. Berkeley played his part in the Scotch and French Wars, sat in parliament, and handed on his estates and dignities to a long line of successors.

An attempt to fasten the guilt of Edward's murder on William Ogle was made somewhat later than the proceedings of the parliament which had already condemned Ogle. Through Ogle it was hoped to attack the memory of Roger Mortimer himself and his still active lieutenant and agent, William Shalford, who, in 1327, had been acting on his behalf as justice of North Wales. This remarkable effort has only recently become known and deserves, therefore, careful consideration from us. It was due to the energy of the numerous Welsh enemies of Mortimer and his agents. These partisans took advantage of the establishment, after the fall of Mortimer and his henchman, of a fresh administration in Wales under the new justice, Sir John Wysham. They took to this officer a remarkable complaint against Shalford's action in September, 1327. Howel ap Gruffydd, a Welsh gentleman of some position, who apparently held a quasi-official position as the king's prosecutor,¹ appeared before justice Wysham, and formally "appealed," that is accused, William Shalford of feloniously encompassing the death of Edward of Carnarvon, and challenged him to trial by battle to prove the accusation. His story was that Shalford procured Edward's death by warning Mortimer, who at once took the hint, that it was only by slaying the ex-king

¹ "Qi suyt pur nostre seignur le roi." See later in appendix.

that the danger of a successful plot to release and restore him could be obviated.

Wysham, an old partisan of Mortimer and Isabella,¹ seems to have been embarrassed by Howel's appeal and referred it to the king's chancery. Thence the case was sent by writ before the justices of what was later called the court of King's Bench, and 18 April, 1331, was appointed for its hearing. The appellant and the defender each found sureties for his appearance, and the fact that many of the leading magnates of Gwynedd, at their head the famous Sir Gruffydd Llwyd, acted as sureties, or "manucaptors," of Howel, shewed how strong was the local backing of the attack on Mortimer's agent. But nothing decisive came of the "appeal". An illness, contracted on his journey to the court, prevented Howel putting in his appearance on the appointed day, or during the short period of grace following. Though he duly presented himself at subsequent hearings some time later, it was finally decided that his claim had been lost through his defeasance.²

The motive for this judgment was not unlikely to have been that same policy of hushing up scandals that had already so strongly influenced the action of the young king in this matter. But it led to no concrete results. Ogle had already escaped, and as he seems soon after to have died abroad, nothing was to be gained by pressing the suit. After all, it was not only an attempt to bring a murderer to justice and to exact reparation from an oppressive governor. It was emphatically a quarrel between the Welsh of Gwynedd and the English dwellers in the garrison towns of North Wales, whom Shalford represented.³ Shalford himself seems soon to have been restored to favour, for we find him acting as keeper of Mortimer's forfeited lands.⁴ Thus once more the welfare of the young king on the throne was preferred to meticulous inquiry as to the circumstances of his father's death.

Of the three reputed murderers of Edward III, we now know how it fared with Ogle. Gurney and Maltravers, alike in their exile,

¹ He had been steward of the household in 1328 and 1329.

² *C.P.R.*, 1330-4, p. 208.

³ The two lists of "manucaptors," for Howel and Shalford respectively, see later in appendix, show this clearly. See also *C.P.R.*, 1330-4, pp. 61, 143.

⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 143, 323. See also *C.C.R.*, 1330-3, pp. 345, 350, 460, 461.

had in the end curiously different fates. Gurney was the only one of the three upon whom Edward III took any trouble to lay hands. In 1331 he was arrested by the king of Castile at the instance of the English king, who sent a member of his household to receive the prisoner. However, long delays ensued and Gurney took advantage of them to effect his escape. Next year the vengeance of the English king ran him to earth at Naples, and this time he was safely delivered to a Yorkshire knight, sent by Edward to bring him home. The route taken was by way of Gascony, and Gurney reached Bayonne in safety. There he broke down in health and died. His keeper meticulously carried out his commission, for he embalmed the body and brought it by sea to England. There, perhaps, the punishment allotted to the living man may have been gratuitously inflicted on his corpse. This is a possible explanation of the story told by Murimuth and copied by Baker, that he was beheaded at sea.

Maltravers lived many years in Flanders, and soon proved himself so useful to Edward III that it was thought injudicious to make any serious attempt to run him to earth. His wife, who lived comfortably on her dower lands in England, was apparently allowed to visit him from time to time, at first under the pretext of a pilgrimage and later without any pretence in the matter.¹ Meanwhile Maltravers seems to have established himself in an influential position in Flanders, and finally did good work for England in cementing the Anglo-Flemish alliance of 1340. Accordingly in 1342 Agnes his wife was allowed to stay with him in Flanders for such time as she pleased, notwithstanding his sentence of banishment from England.² But the crumbling of the Anglo-Flemish alliance in 1345 made Maltravers' position in Flanders precarious, and when in that year Edward III appeared in the port of Sluys to hold his last interview with Artevelde, who went straight from it to his death, Maltravers of his own will submitted to the king and prayed that, as he had been condemned unheard, he might be allowed to stand his trial in parliament. The king declared that, being anxious for justice, and recognising that by Maltravers' loyal service to England in Flanders he had lost all his goods there, and could not abide there longer without great peril, he should receive a safe conduct to

¹ *C.C.R.*, 1330-3, p. 584 (24 July, 1332), license to Agnes Maltravers to cross from Dover going on pilgrimage by the king's license.

² *C.P.R.*, 1340-3, p. 378 (15 February, 1342).

stand his trial. In 1345, as a step towards the restitution of his estates, the king took them out of the jurisdiction of the exchequer and reserved them for the king's chamber.¹ In 1348 he sent Maltravers along with a leading merchant, as his envoy to the "three towns" of Ghent, Bruges, and Ypres.² At last in 1351 Maltravers' restitution was completed. The king annulled his outlawry and restored him to the estate he possessed before the judgment passed against him, and paid a handsome acknowledgment to his great services to the crown and to his resistance of the large offers made to him by the king's adversaries to draw him from his allegiance. Thus the humbler brother-in-law of Berkeley obtained, after over twenty years, the pardon Thomas obtained after seven. He once more sat in parliament, though he was now too old for fighting, so that who would have him a combatant at Crecy and Poitiers confuse him with his son. He died at a good old age in 1364.

The tendency in 1330 and 1331 had been to make the humbler instruments the scapegoat of the real criminals; but though a policy of forget and forgive is doubtless a noble one, we cannot help feeling that the honour of Edward III does not shine the brighter by reason of his easy-going complaisance to his father's murderers. It was, I suspect, but another exemplification of the comfortable system of hushing up scandals, and it was reasonable enough that, so long as the old Queen Isabella was allowed to go free, it was unjust to inflict condign vengeance upon her agents. Like his grandfather Edward I, Edward III probably thought that the wisest course was to wash his dirty linen in all privacy. It was, in fact, another aspect of the policy of silence that had so long enveloped Edward II's fate in mystery. So late as in 1366, when John Froissart paid a visit to Berkeley, that restless seeker after news inquired about Edward of Carnarvon's fate as if it were still a moot question. "I asked," wrote he, "what had happened to that king. An ancient esquire told me that he died within a year of coming to Berkeley, for some one cut his life short. Thus died that king of England. Let us not speak longer of him but turn to the queen and her son." With this outpouring of worldly wisdom, we may leave the matter at rest.

Despite all contrary evidence, the tradition that Edward escaped

¹ *C.C.R.*, 1346-9, p. 89 (10 July, 1346).

² *Fœdera*, iii. 162.

from Berkeley took a long time to vanish, and a discovery of some forty years ago, confirming as it does that letter of John Walwayn, must not be passed over in silence. There is preserved at Montpellier, among the records of the ancient bishopric of Maguelonne,¹ a most remarkable letter written to Edward III by a Genoese priest, beneficed in England. In this the writer informs the king that he had heard in confession that Edward II was still alive and, with absolute contempt of the canon imposing secrecy on confessors, he felt it right to acquaint the king with the circumstances. He goes on to give an entirely accurate and circumstantial account of the misfortunes of the fallen monarch up to his imprisonment at Berkeley. Whether the rest of the story is equally precise is another matter. At Berkeley, the tale proceeds, a servant told Edward of Carnarvon that Thomas Gurney and Simon Barford had come to the castle to slay him, and offered to lend him his clothes that he might effect his escape, disguised as the servant. Edward accepted the proposal, slew the sleeping porter, stole his keys, and obtained his freedom. Gurney and his associate, fearful of the queen's indignation at the escape of her enemy, pretended that the body of the porter was that of her husband, and it was the porter's body which was buried at Gloucester and the porter's heart that was sent in a casket to the queen. The fugitive then found a refuge at Corfe until, after the failure of the earl of Kent, he found it prudent to leave the country. He first fled to Ireland, but afterwards made his way through England and traversed all France from Flanders to Languedoc. At Avignon he had an interview with John XXII who received him kindly. Then followed more wanderings and an ultimate settlement in various hermit cells in Italy, where, apparently, he was still residing at the time of the writing of the letter.

It is a remarkable document, so specious and detailed, and bearing none of those marks by which the gross mediæval forgery can generally be detected. Yet who can believe it true? Who shall decide how it arose? Was it simply a fairy tale? Was it the real confession of a madman? Was it a cunning effort of some French enemies to discredit the conqueror of Crecy? Or was it an intelligent attempt to exact hush money from a famous king whose beginnings

¹ It is printed, with comments, in Stubbs' *Chronicles of Edward I and Edward II*, Introduction to vol. ii., pp. ciii-cviii.

had been based upon his father's murder and his mother's adultery ? One thing only is clear and that is that the political suppression of the truth never pays in the long run and invariably piles up difficulties in the path of those who would evade their troubles by such easy means. Luckily, both for Edward III, and for those who did Edward II to death, the age was not over squeamish, and there is no reason for believing that they were ever a penny the worse from all the attempts to prove that the dead were alive.

It is clear that to the plain man the tomb at Gloucester was believed to contain all that was mortal of the unhappy Edward of Carnarvon. Feasting with Abbot Thoky in the *aula abbatis* on one of his visits to Gloucester, Edward II had noticed the row of royal effigies adorning the walls of the abbot's noble hall. He smilingly asked his host whether his portrait would not in due course be added to them. Thoky answered that he hoped the king would be ultimately placed in a more distinguished place than that which his predecessors occupied. Herein the Gloucester chronicler, who tells the story, claimed Thoky as a true prophet, for the burial place of the victim of Berkeley, on the north side of the high altar of the abbey choir, was soon distinguished by one of the rarest triumphs of fourteenth century craftsmanship, and was resorted to as to a place of pilgrimage by such a crowd of devotees that the church of St. Peter attained a higher state of prosperity and distinction than ever it had had before. No great church could feel content unless it had a saint of its own, sufficiently popular to attract the concourse of the faithful. If not a formally canonised saint, then a reputed saint or martyr would serve at a pinch. The English had acquired the habit of idealising any public character who died of violence as the personification of some principle which it revered. Thus St. Thomas of Canterbury, who really laid down his life to vindicate the supremacy of Canterbury over York, was, all over Europe, worshipped as a martyr for the liberties of holy church. The age of the Edwards preferred a saint who had some touch of politics in him, and the generation which wished to canonise the quarrelsome Archbishop Winchelsea and the disreputable Thomas of Lancaster, gave the informal honours of sanctity to the king who had atoned for the weakness of his life by the tragedy of his end.

It was for a time a matter of dispute, as in the case of Thomas of Lancaster, whether Edward was a saint or not. Many people said that

he died a martyr and did many miracles. But, a cautious chronicler warns us that imprisonment and an opprobrious death make no man a martyr if his holiness of life correspond not to his fame. But the crowd had it over the sceptics, who saw in the visits to the shrine the love of women to go gadding about rather than the impulse of holy zeal. But the doubters were soon silenced. Almost at once king Edward's tomb became a place of pious pilgrimage. Before 1337 the swarm of pilgrims was such that the town of Gloucester could hardly lodge the multitude that thronged to the martyr's shrine from all parts of England.

The material results of this flow of pilgrims was soon seen in the changes wrought in the fabric of the house of St. Peter's at Gloucester. At first their offerings enabled Abbot Wigmore (1329-37) to completely rebuild, from foundations to roof, the "aisle of St. Andrew," that is, the south transept of his church. This was but the first step in a long process. Before his death in 1337 Abbot Wigmore had made substantial progress towards the reconstruction of the eastern half of the abbey church which resulted in the transepts and choir, though retaining their ancient romanesque core, being faced with a casing of masonry erected in the fashion of building called "perpendicular". The mediæval architect was no archæologist, but the Gloucester work solved cheaply and effectively the problem how a Norman structure might, without the expense of rebuilding, be converted into the semblance of an up-to-date modern church. The problem was a general one, and there is no wonder that the solution begun in the south transept of Gloucester Abbey was imitated far and wide. Thus the "perpendicular" style of building was taken from its first home of Gloucester and was adapted and popularised by Edington and Wykeham in their grandiose operations at Winchester and elsewhere. It should, however, be clearly remembered that the needs resulting from the cult of Edward of Carnarvon, and the affluence which flowed from this, first started the new style. This fact alone would give Gloucester a place of its own in architectural history.¹

Among the pilgrims to Gloucester came Edward III, his son the Black Prince, his wife Philippa of Hainault, and his sister Queen Joan of Scotland. Their lavish offerings increased the luxury of the

¹ See for this R. Willis in *Archæological Journal*, xvii. 335-42 (1860).

equipment of the minster and found its finest expression in the famous tomb¹ with its delicate tabernacle work and its striking effigy of the beautiful but weak face of the murdered king. The "right goodly and sumptuous" cloisters, the "exceedingly fair" central tower,² the beginnings of the rebuilding of the western part of the nave, all testified that the succeeding generations of Gloucester monks still had the means and the taste to carry further the reconstruction of their church and cloister after the best fashions of the "perpendicular" period. But the cult of Edward of Carnarvon was too artificial to endure for long, and there is little evidence that it survived the fifteenth century. That this and so many other popular canonisations failed to establish themselves is one of the minor obligations we owe to the papacy, whose rigid method of inquiry into the claims of candidates for saintship did so much to uphold the gravity of mediæval worship amidst the flood of superstition and credulity that threatened to overwhelm it.

¹ For the tomb, see *Archæological Journal*, xvii. 297-319 (1860).

² I quote the words of Leland, *Itinerary*, ii. 61.

APPENDIX I

A WELSH CONSPIRACY TO RELEASE EDWARD II.

I AM indebted to Mr. Edward Owen, whose *flair* for finding out new points of mediæval Welsh history is well known, for the opportunity of studying the record of the appeal of Howel ap Gruffydd against William of Shalford¹ for compassing the death of Edward II. This is not quite a new discovery, for the late Mr. T. G. Williams has already published a short paper on the matter in the Cardiff *Nationalist*, Vol. III., No. 28, pp. 26-30 (July, 1909). Mr. Williams, however, only knew the story from the Floyd transcripts, now in the National Library of Wales, and his interesting comments are partially vitiated by his not being quite in a position to put the incident in its historical setting. Mr. Edward Owen, to whom I also owe my knowledge of Mr. Williams' article, found the record referred to in the *Coram Rege Rolls*, and made a transcript of it, which he has most kindly allowed me to use for my paper, and print here. I have "extended" to the best of my ability Mr. Owen's transcript, and have compared it with the original manuscript roll. There must, however, always have been some doubt as to the extension of proper names. In particular Welsh personal and place-names open up an abundant source of error, because they were often written out by scribes ignorant and incurious of Welsh. If this be the case sometimes with documents emanating from the chanceries at Carnarvon and Carmarthen, it must be still more the case with a record of the justices *coram rege*, whose clerks are not likely to have had either knowledge or interest in the matter. How much truth there was in Howel's story must remain an open question.

¹ William of Shalford, king's clerk, was a minor member of the bureaucracy, who devoted a long career to the royal service in Wales. His activity extended from before 1301 to at least 1337, when he received a grant of lands because he had been employed under Edward I and Edward II in repressing sedition and putting down rebels in North Wales (*C.P.R.*, 1334-8, p. 399). He was constable of the castles, and therefore mayor of the towns, of Carnarvon and Criccieth, and lieutenant of Mortimer as justice of North Wales. Changing his allegiance with each change of government, he was royalist up to 1326, a partisan of Mortimer from 1326-30 and finally became in May, 1331, keeper of Mortimer's forfeited lands in Wales, and in high favour with such personal adherents of Edward III as William Montagu, Earl of Salisbury. In 1339 he, or a namesake of another generation but the same clan, was appointed baron and remembrancer of the exchequer of North Wales at Carnarvon (*ib.*, 1338-40, p. 322). Our text shows that he was a burgess of Carnarvon, in which town he naturally mainly resided.

But that there was some conspiracy in Gwyndod is proved by the wholesale arrests made about October, 1327, at Carnarvon of men like Gruffydd Llwyd and Howel himself, who were prominent in the proceedings of 1331.¹

Apart from the new side light thrown by the record on the circumstances preceding Edward of Carnarvon's death, the document suggests some important subjects of discussion in relation to general Welsh history. I cannot deal with these on this occasion, but I hope some one will be found who is willing to work them up. The most striking is the interesting problem of the jurisdiction of the English court in what was substantially a Welsh cause.² This point was apparently raised at some of the hearings, but the decision carefully evaded an opinion as to the main issue. Jurisdiction was claimed because what had happened in Berkeley happened in England, but no opinion was expressed either for or against the doctrine that suits from Carnarvon ought not to be brought *coram rege* by way of appeal. As "the Principality" was at the moment in the king's hands, and the justices *coram rege* were supposed to be the mere mouthpieces of the king's personal judgments, it is difficult to see how a decision adverse to their jurisdiction could be compatible with feudal or monarchical tradition. But the strongly expressed claim of Howel that, as a foreigner, he was not amenable to English courts, is worth noting, if only as an assertion of the nationalist point of view. This is the more remarkable because of Howel's connections with Gruffydd Llwyd and the Welsh official class, whose whole-hearted adherence to their English princes is one of the most remarkable features of early fourteenth century Welsh history. Moreover, as Mr. J. G. Edwards has pointed out to me, Howel is probably the same person as the Howel ap Gruffydd who represented Anglesea in the parliament of 1327 on one of the two occasions before Henry VIII when Welsh members were summoned.

RECORD OF THE APPEAL OF HOWEL AP GRUFFYDD AGAINST
WILLIAM OF SHALFORD.

[From *Coram Rege Rolls*, 5 Edw. III, Trinity Term, No. 285, *Placita corone*, M. 9 (towards the end).]³

ADHUC DE TERMINO SANCTE TRINITATIS.

WALLIA. Dominus rex mandavit justiciario suo Northwallie breue suum in hec verba—Edwardus Dei gratia rex Anglie, dominus Hibernie et dominus

¹ *C.C.R.*, 1327-30, p. 182. They were released on bail on 26 October.

² A similar claim to exemption from the jurisdiction of the ordinary English courts was raised in 1310 on behalf of the "palatinate" of Chester. See Miss M. Tout's note on "Comitatus Palacii" in *English Hist. Rev.*, XXXV, 418-19 (1920). Both in Cheshire and in the Principality these claims were made at a time when the two great franchises in question were in the king's hands.

³ In *Chancery Miscellanea*, Bundle 87, File 1, No. 21, is a fragment of the writ in this case. It has supplied some useful corrections of proper names. It should be noted that the proceedings *coram rege* were at Lincoln.

Aquitanie, justiciario suo Northwallie vel eius locum tenenti salutem. Cum Howelus ap Griffidd appellet coram vobis Willelmum de Shaldeford de quibusdam sedicionibus, confederacionibus et excessibus, tam contra dominum Edwardum quondam regem Anglie, patrem nostrum, quam contra nos factis, ac appellum illud alibi quam coram nobis terminari non possit, vobis mandamus firmiter iniungentes quod appellum predictum cum attachiamentis et omnibus adminiculis appellum illud tangentibus nobis sub sigillo vestro distincte et aperte sine dilacione mittatis, et hoc breue, ut ulterius in hac parte quod iustum fuerit fieri faciamus. Teste me ipso, apud Eltham, xxvii^o die Marcii, anno regni nostri quinto.¹

Pretextu cuius brevis predictus justiciarius misit coram domino rege in cancellaria sua appellum predictum in hec verba.

Howel ap Griffud, qe cy est, qe suyt pur nostre seignur le roi qore est, appelle Willame de Shaldeforde, qe illeoqes est, du consail et de compassement de la mort sire Edward, pierre nostre seignur le roi qore est, qe Dieu garde, felonousement et traierousement occis et muredretz. Et pur ceo du consail et cumpassement qe le lundy procheyn apres la feste de la Natiuite nostre Dame, lan du regne nostre seignur le roi Edward qore est, qe Dieu gard, premer,² a Rosfeyre en Anglesea,³ mesme celuy Willame ordeina et fist une lettre, et la maunda a sire Rogier de Mortymer a Bergeueny, en la quele lettre fust contenuz qe sire Rees ap Griffud⁴ et autres de sa coueigne assemblerent poer en Southgales et en Northgales, par assent dascuns des grantz de la terre Dengleterre, pur forciblement deliuerer le dit sire Edward, pierre nostre dit seignur le roi, qe adunqes fust detenuz en le chastiel de Bercleye; et luy fist entendre par sa dite lettre qe si le dit sire Edward fust deliures en ascune manere, qe le dit sire Rogier et touz les seons morreient de male mort, ou serroient destrutz a remenaunt. Sur quoi le dit Willame, trayterousement come traytour, par la dite lettre conseilla le dit sire Rogier qil ordinast tiel remede endroit des choses susdites qe le dit sire Rees ne nul autre Dengleterre ne de Gales aueroient matere de penser de sa deliuerance. Sur quey le dit sire Rogier monstra la dite

¹ 28 March, 1331.

² Monday, 14 September, 1327.

³ Rhosfair, Mr. J. G. Edwards tells me, was the chief vill in the Anglesea cwmwd of Menai, a residence of Llewelyn the Great, and the site of the later "English" borough of Newborough.

⁴ Rhys ap Gruffydd was a magnate of West Wales, king's yeoman under Edward II and often employed as arrayer of troops from South Wales, lieutenant of the justice of South Wales and keeper of Dynevor and other castles and lands in that district. He was faithful to Edward II to the end (*Fœdera*, II, 647). Subsequently pardoned and knighted, he led the revolt of 1327 in South Wales. In February, 1328, he was again pardoned (*C.P.R.*, 1327-30, pp. 238, 242, 256). His offences included disobedience to royal orders, adhering to the Scots and departure from the realm. *C.P.R.*, 1321-24, p. 398, throws light upon his family connections. He stood to West Wales almost in the relation in which Gruffydd Llwyd stood to North Wales.

lettre a Willame Docleye,¹ et lui comaunda de porter la dite lettre a Berclaye a ceux qauoient le dit sire Edward en garde ; et lui chargea qe les chargeast de part lui qils soient consaillaunt sur les pointz contenuz deinz la dite lettre et qils feisseit hastiue remedie pur greindre peril eschuer. Le quel Willame Docleye enprist la charge, et fist le comandement le dit sire Rogier. Sur quoi le dit Willame Docleye et les autres qauoient le dit sire Edward en gard trayterousement oscirent et murdrirent le dite sire Edward, pier nostre seignur le roi, en destruction du saunc real. Cel conseil et compassement fist le dit Willame de Shaldeforde, trayterousement come traitour, encountre sa ligeaunce, en destruction de real sanc nostre dit seignur le roi, par le quel consaill et compassement le dit sire Edward, pier nostre dit seignur le roi, fu trayterousment oscis et murdretz. Et si le dit Willame de Shaldeford le veot dedire, le dit Howel, come liges homme nostre dit seignur le roi, est prest a prouer le, sur lui par son corps, come sur le traitour nostre dit seignur le roi. Et a ceo faire le dit Howel ad done son gage en la mayn monsire Johan de Wysham, justice nostre seignur le roi en Northgales, a Beaumaroyes, le viij^e jour de mars, et ad troue xij plegges de suyr cest appel, cest asauoir sire Griffud Thl[oyd],² Gronou ap Tuder, et autres.

Misit eciam predictus justiciarius cancellarie regis predicti manucap-tionem predicti Howelli in hec verba—Pateat uniuersis per presentes quod nos, Griffinus ap Rees, Gronou ap Tuder, loreward ap Griffid, Willyam ap Griffid, Dauid ap Gwyn, Griffid ap Edeneued, Tuder ap Dauid, leuan ap Edeneued, Lewelin ap Adam, Cadugan ap Rees, Adam Gough ap Adam, loreward ap Eignoun ap loreward, Tegwered ap leuan, loreward Gough ap Howel, Eignon ap Adam ap Mereduk, loreward ap Dauid, leuan ap Keneuth,³ loreward ap Maddok Thloit, accepimus in ballium die confec-tionis presentium de domino Johanne de Wysham, justiciario Northwallie, corpus Howelli ap Griffud ap loreward in castro de Kaernaruan incarcerati, videlicet unusquisque nostrum, corpus pro corpore, sub omni eo quod erga dominum regem forisfacere poterimus, ad habendum corpus suum coram domino rege apud Westmonasterium, xvij^o die Aprilis proxime futuro, ad prosequendum appellum suum versus Willelmum de Shaldeford de morte domini Edwardi regis Anglie, patris domini regis nunc, unde cum appellauit, et ad faciendum super premissis id quod dominus rex et consilium eius ordinauerint. In cuius rei testimonium presentibus sigilla nostra apposuimus.

¹ This person is generally called Ogle in modern books and sometimes in the sources. But I suspect that William of Ockley was his real name. This text explains for the first time why he was charged with Edward's murder.

² Gruffydd ap Rhys and Gruffydd Llwyd are, as Mr. J. G. Edwards has conclusively shown, one and the same person. Mr. Edwards points out to me that the fact that Gruffydd Llwyd was at large in 1331 tends towards confirming his conjecture as to the date of Gruffydd's second imprisonment. For this see *English Hist. Rev.*, XXX, 596-98 (1915).

³ "Keneuth" is the clear reading. "Cynfrig" is probably the name meant by the clerk.

Datum apud Kaernaruan, die Jovis proximo post diem dominicam in Ramis Palmarum, anno regni regis Edwardi tercii post conquestum quinto.¹

Insuper misit idem justiciarius quandam aliam manucapcionem predicti Willelmi de Shaldeford in cancellaria predicta in hec verba—Pateat uniuersis par presentes quod nos, Hugo de Hamnton, senior, Rogerus de Acton, Johannes de Hamnton, Ricardus de Monte Gomeri, Philippus de Neuton, Robertus de Helpeston, Johannes de Baddesleie, Henricus le Taillour, Johannes de Harleye, Radulphus de Neuport, Henricus de Euerdon, et Willelmus Lagheles, burgenses ville de Kaernaruan, Henricus Somer, Willelmus Adynet, Nicholaus de Saredon, Robertus le Porter, Willelmus Sturmy, Petrus de Ouerton, Johannes de Morton, Johannes del Wode et Rogerus de Wolashale, burgenses ville de Conewey, Thomas de Peulesdon, burgensis ville de Bala, Johannes le Colier et Walterus filius Dauid, burgenses ville de Hardelagh, accepimus in ballium die confeccionis presencium, de domino Johanni de Wysham, justiciario North Wallie, corpus Willelmi de Shaldeford, burgensis ville de Kaernaruan, in castro de Kaernaruan, eodem die incarcerati, ad prosecutionem cuiusdam appelli per Howelum ap Griffith ap Ioreward versus ipsum Willelmum facti, videlicet unusquisque nostrum, corpus pro corpore, et sub omni eo quod erga dominum regem forisfacere poterimus, ad habendum corpus, eius coram domino rege apud Westmonasterium, xvij^o die Aprilis proxime futuro, ad faciendum super premissis quod idem dominus rex et eius consilium ordinauerint. In cuius rei testimonium presentibus sigilla nostra opposuimus. Datum apud Caernaruan die Veneris, xxij^o die Martii, anno regni regis Edwardi tercii post conquestum quinto.

Quod quidem appellum vna cum manucapcionibus predictis dominus rex misit a cancellaria sua justiciariis suis hic in hec verba—Edwardus, Dei gracia rex Anglie, dominus Hibernie et dux Aquitanie, dilectis et fidelibus suis, Galfrido le Scrope et sociis suis justiciariis ad placita coram nobis tenenda assignatis, salutem. Mittimus vobis sub pede sigilli nostri appellum quod Howelus ap Griffith fecit coram justiciario nostro Northwallie versus Willelmum de Shaldeford de quibusdam sedicionibus, confederacionibus et excessibus tam contra dominum Edwardum, quondam regem Anglie patrem nostrum, quam contra nos factis. Quod quidem appellum coram nobis in cancellaria nostra certis de causis venire fecimus, ut ulterius in hac parte fieri faciatis quod secundum legem et consuetudinem regni nostri fuerit facienda. Teste Johanne de Eltham, comite Cornubie, fratre nostro, custode regni nostri, apud Eltham, xvij^o die Aprilis anno regni nostri quinto.

Ad quem xvij^m diem Aprilis, scilicet anno regni domini regis nunc quinto, venit predictus Willelmus de Shaldeford per manucapcionem supradictam, et optulit se versus predictum Howel ap Griffith de appello suo. Et predictus Howell, eodem die et in crastino solempniter vocatus, non venit; set tercio die sequenti post predictum xvij^m diem venit. Et allocutus de eo quod non venit ad predictum xvij^m diem coram rege, sicut mandatum fuit, prosequendus appellum suum predictum, dicit quod ipse in veniendo per viam apud Wigorniam versus curiam, hic infirmabatur per duos dies quod nullo modo

¹ 28 March, 1331.

potuit equitare, nec ad diem predictum hic interesse. Et hoc verificare prout curia, etc. Et super hoc certis de causis datus est dies tam predicto Howello quam predicto Willelmo coram rege a die sancti Trinitatis in xv dies,¹ ubicumque, etc. Et predictus Howelus interim dimittitur per manucapcionem Griffith Ffloyt militis, Dauid ap Howel, Grone ap Yerwath, Lewelyn ap Griffuth, Griffyn ap Dauid, et Yerwarth ap Adam, omnes de Wallia, qui eum manuceperunt habendum coram domino rege ad prefatum terminum, videlicet corpus pro corpore, etc. Quod Willelmus de Shaldeford similiter dimittitur per manucapcionem Nicholai de Acton clerici, Johannis de Ouer-ton, Johannis Stutmere de comitatu Salopie, . . . Benet de comitatu Somersete, Dionisii de Wathe de comitatu Lincolnie et Johannis de Housom de comitatu Eboraci, qui eum manuceperunt coram domino rege ad prefatum terminum ubicumque, etc., videlicet corpora pro corpore, etc.

Ad quam quindenam sancte Trinitatis, scilicet anno regni domini regis nunc quinto, venerunt tam predictus Howelus ap Griffith quam predictus Willelmus de Shaldeford [in] personis suis. Et predictus Willelmus de Shaldeford dicit quod predictus Howelus ap Griffith alias habuit diem, scilicet xviii^o die Aprilis proximo preterrito, ad proseguendum appellum suum predictum coram domino rege hic, etc. Ad quem diem idem Howel licet [et primo] et secundo die solempniter vocatus fuerit, non venit, appellum suum predictum prosecuturus, etc. Et ex quo appellatores quilibet parati esse debeant, etc., petit iudicium de non secta sua, etc. Et predictus Howel dicit quod ipse est alienigena natus in principatu Wallie extra regnum Anglie, et licet ipse paratus sit appellum suum prosecui ubi et quando, etc., de appellis tamen seu de aliis placitis emergentibus infra principatum predictum, habet deduci per legem et consuetudinem eiusdem principatus, non per legem Anglicanam, etc. Et super hoc veniunt Griffyn ap Rees, Rees ap Griffyn, Dauid ap Howel, Seroun ap Yerewarth, Yereward Tue, Griffyn ap Kegnny,² et alii pro se et comunitate tocius principatus predicti; et petunt quod de appello predicto quod infra principatum predictum emersit, cuius cognito infra eundem principatum habet deduci et non alibi, quod ipsi non ponantur in placitum in curia hic contra legem et consuetudinem principatus predicti, etc. Et super hoc quibusdam certis de causis datus est eis dies coram domino rege a die sancti Michaelis in tres septimanas,³ ubicumque, etc., eodem statu quo nunc, etc. Et predictus Howelus interim dimittitur per manucapcionem Griffini ap Rees, Rees ap Griffyn, Dauid ap Howel, Seroun ap Herewarth, Yarward Tue, Griffyn ap Tudor, Dauid ap Rees, Griffyn ap Deuoueyt, Euwan ap Griffith, Dauid ap Kethin, Maddok ap Dauid, et Tudor ap Dauid, qui eum manuceperunt habendum coram domino rege ad prefatum diem, videlicet corpora pro corpore, etc. Et similiter predictus Willelmus de Shaldeford interim dimittitur per manucapcionem Howeli ap Maddok de Nanconewey, Johannis de Hamtone de comitatu de Caernaruan, Johannis de Housum de comitatu Eboraci, Johannis de Erewell⁴ de comitatu Angleseia, Johannis de Eccleshale de comitatu Staffordie,

¹ 10 June, 1331.

² or Kegnuy.

³ 20 (or 21) October, 1331.

⁴ The reading in *Chanc. Misc.* is "Eriswell".

Ricardi Bagh de Cruk,¹ Ricardi de Wymesbury de comitatu Salopie, et Johannis de Ouerton de eodem comitatu, qui eum manuceperunt habendum² coram domino rege ad prefatum terminum ubicumque, etc., videlicet corpora pro corpore, etc.

Ad quem diem veniunt tam predictus Howelus ap Griffith quam predictus Willelmus de Shaldeford per manucaptos predictos. Et inspecto recordo predicto, compertum est in eodem quod alias in curia hic, scilicet ad predictum decimum octauum diem Aprilis, predictus Howelus, primo et secundo die exactus, non venit appellum predictum prosecuturus ubi secundum legem et consuetudinem regni Anglie considerari deberet, quod idem Howelus esset non prosecutus, si appellum illud esset acceptabile secundum legem et consuetudinem regni predicti. Et similiter compertum est in eodem, quod predictus Howelus, appellatus predictum Willelmum de quibusdam contentis in appello, que fieri deberent infra principatum Wallie et de quibusdam que fieri deberent apud Berkele infra regnum Anglie, quod quidem appellum in curia regis hic secundum legem et consuetudinem regni Anglie ad finalem exitum deducendum sine die non potest in forma predicta, per quod dictum est eis quod eant inde sine die, etc.

¹ Probably, but not certainly, Criccieth.

² The MS. reading is "habendi".



APPENDIX II.

A POEM ATTRIBUTED TO EDWARD II.

THERE has long lurked at Longleat a manuscript, the property of the Marquis of Bath, which includes a French poem described as "De le roi Edward le fiz roi Edward le chanson qe il fist mesmes". It has been known to some extent by reason of a misleading Latin version in Fabyan's *Chronicle* (p. 185), and has been shortly described in *Hist. MSS. Commission*, Third Report, Ap., p. 180. It purports to be written by the king in his captivity, and describes his emotions and sufferings with some sincerity and feeling. Prof. Studer of Oxford tells me that he had transcribed this poem from the Longleat manuscript and proposes shortly to publish it. The manuscript is, Prof. Studer thinks, not later than 1350, so that its definite ascription of its authorship to the king has some measure of authority. The question whether Edward wrote the poem can only be settled, if ever, when we have the text before us. Certainly, if Edward II ever took to literature, he would have written in French, and his love of minstrels, play-actors, and music may conceivably have driven him in the leisure of his imprisonment into verse. On the other hand he seems to me to have been unlikely to write anything. It is, therefore, tempting to suggest that the poem is another part of the case for exciting sympathy with the dethroned king in his misfortunes and is likely, therefore, to be a conscious effort of his numerous and eager partisans to effect his release, reinstatement or canonisation, rather than an original outpouring of an illiterate sovereign. Meanwhile I should add that Prof. Studer, who, unlike myself, knows the poem at first hand, is impressed with the possibility of its having been composed by Edward of Carnarvon. In any case he will be doing a real service to scholarship by printing so interesting a document. I must express my obligation to him for having discussed the matter with me and for affording me the material on which this note is based.

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SOME CONFLICTING TENDENCIES IN ENGLISH ADMINISTRATIVE HISTORY DURING THE FOURTEENTH CENTURY

BY

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
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ENTHUSIASTS for the Middle Ages have often said hard things about the fourteenth century. They have regarded it as a period of declension from the fuller embodiment of the mediæval ideal expressed in its predecessor. However such things may be from some points of view, yet in others there are counterbalancing considerations. In particular we may affirm with confidence that the fourteenth century comes nearer to us moderns in all that concerns the theory and attributes of the state. It is a time when the great states of Europe first recognized in the ideal of nationality a principle justifying their withdrawal from even a theoretical part in that universal monarchy of Christendom, which Dante strove in vain to preach to an indifferent world. Each national state tried to make its authority real by the development of an administrative system of ever-increasing complexity. That same Hundred Years War, which made nations of both France and England, involved special and continued efforts which were beyond the resources of the primitive feudal state. It followed that not only a modern nation, but the modern conception of the state began to emerge from these exertions. The political machinery of the fourteenth century became much more than a simple adaptation of the primitive royal household to the government of the body politic.

Not only had the state to enlarge its resources and finance wars,

¹ This paper is an expansion of a lecture delivered at the John Rylands Library on 14 Feb., 1923. The substance of it in a shortened form was read as a communication to the Fifth International Historical Conference at Brussels on 12 April following.



waged on a larger scale, and with greater continuity of effort, than had been the case with the superficial hostilities of the feudal age. Even in peace times the state acted upon a conception of its functions as wide as that of our own days. There were no Benthamites or Herbert Spencerians in the fourteenth century. If there was anything amiss in society, it was the business of the state to set it right. Mediæval polity was normally monarchical, but if the prince failed to accomplish his task, it was the duty of the magnates of the realm, his natural born councillors, to advise him or to coerce him to do his duty. The administrative result was not different in either case, for the state worked in the same way and through the same machinery, whether it were under monarchical or aristocratic control. Under either conditions there were great armies to be raised, organised and paid for, and a host of officials to be empowered to deal with the innumerable cases where state intervention was necessary. Despite wars, material prosperity followed economic development and raised questions which the state had perforce to grapple with. The state had to see that the profiteers did not charge excessive prices, or set an evil example by flaunting their jewels, furs and luxuries before poorer folk. The state had to see that workmen received reasonable wages, reasonable wages of course being those suggested by the traditions of the good old times. The state had to watch every market, punish monopolists, forestallers and regrattors. It had to see that weights and measures were honest and true, and it had to prevent clipped, false or debased coin from circulating. When the state had done its best to make people good by act of parliament, the church, a rival state within the state, watched with equal meticulousness over the orthodoxy and morals of the plain man. Like the state, the church had its courts to enforce its decisions, and an army of officials of both church and state scattered summonses and citations, admonitions and mandates over the land. Besides the central authorities there were local officers in every manor or franchise, borough or shire, guild or corporation, each vieing with the other in their efforts to govern. Altogether the plain man of the fourteenth century was a much ruled, much regulated man. It was well for his self-respect that the various jurisdictions, which competed to wield him to their will, lost some of their effectiveness because they came into conflict with each other, or because the force behind them was not always sufficient to enable them to carry out their wishes.

The rising tide of nationalism was beginning to threaten the common civilisation of the western world, but had not yet overflowed it. Accordingly any administrative tendency which we find accentuated in one particular country is still likely to have a general repercussion in its neighbour lands. The French and English monarchies, the *curia romana* in its exile on the banks of the Rhone, and many minor authorities were still dealing with analogous problems in not dissimilar ways. Of these efforts the movements in England have been the least investigated, though the materials for their study are extraordinarily complete. For the moment, however, the student of English administration has still to play the part of a pioneer. He has to cut his own paths through the trackless forest of a new world. He finds it hard to see the wood for the trees which obscure his vision. But he is powerfully tempted to clear his mind by attempting some sort of a general survey. The final judgment cannot yet be made, but even a rude sketch may make it easier for others to draw up the more accurate plan that may replace it.

By the fourteenth century English central administration was well under the control of the crown. The king governed the country. He had, of course, to take advice, but the consultative bodies, whether the permanent council of officials, the occasional great councils of magnates or the representative parliaments of barons, prelates and commons, were not executive in a direct sense. They advised the king what to do, but effective action could only be taken by the monarch, whose sealed writs, embodying his commands, were issued by the ministries which were his executive agents. England had since the twelfth century enjoyed the best bureaucracy at the disposal of any secular prince. But its very perfection caused the administrative machine to become less entirely at the disposal of the monarch. Institutions that had arisen out of the primitive household had already begun to go "out of court" and to think as much of the traditions and rules of the office as of the immediate interests of their master. This was notably the case with the exchequer, the English equivalent to the continental chamber, and was becoming also the case with the great administrative office of the chancery. Official precedents were made the most of by the dignified prelates at the head of these departments. Such ministers found themselves more in sympathy with the baronage than with the court, for the baronage was the natural

antagonist of monarchical pretension. Thus the routine, devised to restrain the aristocracy, grew into a check on the arbitrary power of the crown. The king still had a remedy for this within his own household. The household still retained within itself secretarial and financial departments which could both supplement and check the operations of the chancery and exchequer. The administrative centre of the household in England was now the king's wardrobe, whose secretariat was the privy seal. The wardrobe controlled the whole revenue and expenditure of the court, like the *camera denariorum* of the French monarchy. The result was a duplication of administrative machinery, which was all the more efficient since chancery and wardrobe, exchequer and chamber, constantly overlapped, each being regarded as almost equally competent within the whole administrative sphere.

This distinction between the household of the sovereign and the national offices of state is the most fundamental of the conflicting tendencies which I am attempting to emphasise in the field of fourteenth-century administration. Yet we must not overstress the contrast between them, and still less must we assume that either crown or magnates was clearly conscious of any such opposition. To both crown and barons household and state remained identical, and the household and political offices seemed but different aspects of one administration. A weak king, like Henry III., might seek to reduce the chancery and exchequer to dependence on himself as direct as was the subservience of the household staff to its master. A strong king, like Edward I., might secure a vigorous and united ministry by the combination of the household and national offices in a single whole. Edward I. certainly saw in the king's wardrobe the best school of loyal statesmanship and the department most easily expansible to meet the exceptional calls upon the resources of the state, which the over-ambitious enterprises of his later life had involved him in, obligations almost beyond his strength. He waged his wars and directed his foreign policy mainly through the agency of his household officers.

The baronial opposition to Edward I.'s later policy renewed the outcry, already begun under Henry III., against household administration. The same complaint arose from time to time all through the fourteenth century. The wardrobe was checked by the demand that all revenue should be paid into the exchequer : the privy seal of the household by the emphasis laid upon the rights of the great seal of the

chancellor. Under a feeble king, like Edward II., the opposition strove in the ordinances of 1311 to bring household and national offices equally under its control. The ordainers succeeded to a large extent in subjecting to their authority the old strongholds of household administration. But the resources of the courtiers were not yet exhausted. The king's chamber was expanded and developed, after the fashion of France, to form a self-sufficing household department, freed from baronial and official control, untrammelled by precedent, and capable of adaptation to all new emergencies. The chamber secretariat with the secret seal comes into prominence, as soon as the wardrobe and privy seal had been annexed by the barons. By the device of reserving manors to the king's chamber a new royal domain arose, outside the control of the exchequer and securing for the monarch a personal revenue and sphere of untrammelled action. Later in the reign the restored power of the crown, after the fall of the contrarians in 1322, restricted the scope of the chamber action. It was originally intended that the huge forfeitures of the "contrariant barons" should be administered by the king's chamber alone. But it was one of the first acts of Bishop Stapeldon's noteworthy treasurer-ship that he transferred the rule of this great estate to the exchequer and so prevented the chamber from becoming a formidable rival to the exchequer. That he was permitted to do this suggests that Edward II. and the Despensers were so satisfied with their position that they were content to go back to the unitary administration of Edward I. They felt no need then to aim at emphasizing the rights of the household offices. The noteworthy reform of the exchequer itself by Stapeldon made this venerable office more competent to discharge its ever-increasing task. Consequential on the Stapeldon reforms was the reorganisation of the wardrobe and household. From this followed the splitting up of the household administration into various departments, each separately accounting at the exchequer. The result of this process was to facilitate the tendency to transfer the directive power from the household to the ancient offices of state.

It followed from all this that the later years of the reign of Edward II. was a period of great and radical administrative reform. But fourteenth-century Englishmen had no love of revolution, and clung to the fixed conception that the ancient constitution gave them all that was necessary, and that any changes to be introduced were rather in the

direction of the removal of administrative abuses than designed to change the framework of political organization. The personal aims of the radical reformers about the court were enough to discredit the changes for which they were responsible. When in the revolution of 1326 Edward II. lost his throne and his life the radical changes were violently swept away. There was partial compensation for this in the survival of the departmental reforms which ensured some measure of permanence to Stapeldon's work. But it is significant of the drift of opinion that Stapeldon, the cautious administrative reformer, lost his life at the hands of the mob as surely as the Despensers perished by the condemnation of the baronage.

The revolution of 1326 was inspired by the conservative traditions of the ordainers. It aimed at putting the state under the control of the barons rather than the courtiers. It was symbolized in the restoration of Henry of Lancaster to the earldoms of his martyred brother, Earl Thomas, and giving him, at least nominally, the highest position in the councils of the young Edward III. For the Lancastrian tradition, which had inspired the ordainers, still exercised great influence. It was not only the pretext for the revolution of 1326. The excuse for the revolution of 1330 was that the followers of Mortimer had deserted the ways of the ordainers. The king's emancipation was not, however, exclusively a Lancastrian movement. Like the revolution of 1326, it was brought about by a coalition between the old opposition and the personal followers that the young king had gathered round him. After Edward's triumph both elements had to be respected, and the policy of the next eight or ten years shows a careful balancing between the barons and the courtiers. At first the former were most to the fore. With the Earl of Lancaster as his most powerful ally, with the great administrative family of the Stratfords holding in turn the chief offices of state, the young king had every inducement to follow their conservative policy. But he seems gradually to have resented their tutelage and his real aim seems to have been to shake himself as free from it as he dared. Anyhow, it is clear, after a few years, that Edward was gradually feeling his way towards a revival of the personal policy of his father and the Despensers. The chief evidence of this is the revival of the "administrative chamber" as it had been in the days of Edward II. Again there were manors reserved to the chamber, whose business was so important that a special

seal, the griffin seal, was established for transactions relating to them. A whole hierarchy of officers, local and central, safeguarded this new jurisdiction. The chamber estates with their justices and escheators, their stewards and their auditors, formed new royal franchises, virtually outside the ordinary system that was controlled by chancery and exchequer. The receivers of the chamber became the most energetic and pushful of the king's ministers ; the secret seal, kept in the chamber, almost ousted the privy seal as the expression of the king's personal wishes. The receivers extended their claims so far that they refused to render their accounts to the exchequer. If they accounted at all, it was to the king in person, and if the king were satisfied no one else had any right to say anything. When receiver Hatfield tendered his account to the chamber, the king accepted it and caused his rolls and memoranda to be burnt that they might not again come into demand. Mandates based on this remarkable statement were sent both to the exchequer and wardrobe. If the wardrobe still meekly sent in its bills to the exchequer, the newly furbished instrument of prerogative recognized no such limitation to its authority. The same period saw a steady enhancement of the dignity and power of the keeper of the privy seal, and the promotion of more than one receiver of the chamber to this office shows that Edward again regarded it as a confidential secretariat. Under Edward II. the keeper of the privy seal had been a subordinate to the keeper of the wardrobe. Now keepers of the wardrobe received promotion when they were made keepers of the privy seal. The hierarchy of office was clearly privy seal, chamber, wardrobe. If household control were to be revived, it would be household control of a somewhat novel type.

The years which witnessed the resurrection of the chamber were filled with other administrative experiments, experiments in the adjustment of the escheatrics and the staple, and in the direction of providing local justices under royal commission who were soon to assume the title of justices of the peace. In every direction there was some increase of bureaucratic control ; considerable increase in the quality and numbers of the members of the bureaucracy. Before these processes had gone very far the outbreak of war on an unprecedented scale of magnitude and duration put to the trial all the resources of the state.

A mediæval state was hardly able to carry on adequately in

periods of such peace as the chronic disorders of the times allowed. The cry that the king should "live of his own," though continually in the mouth of parliaments was never, even in peace time, practical politics. Any long continued extraordinary expenditure of money and effort was destructive to the whole machine of state. When ambition led Edward III. to attempt the conquest first of Scotland and then of France, times of trial arose which soon tested to the full his administrative system. It is a proof of the unchangeableness of the mediæval mind that Edward III. aspired to carry through costly warlike expeditions very much in the same way as his grandfather had done. If special machinery were needed for war conditions, it was to be found in the utilization and expansion of the household system on which Edward I. had relied. The recent developments of the household system thus served a useful purpose, and Edward III. was at least better prepared to face the situation than his grandfather had been. The wardrobe once again becomes important when its knights and troopers swell into the dimensions of a great corps of household troops, when its clerks turn tax-gatherers, negotiators of loans and treaties, paymasters of soldiers, sailors, and foreign allies, keepers of army and navy lists and the rest. The king's household servants were regarded as competent to discharge any odd job that had to be done. The chamber was easily expansible in a similar fashion ; its operations were secret, untrammelled by precedent and entirely under royal direction. The great wardrobe was already a storage and army clothing department whence the armies in the field, whether at home or overseas, could be supplied. There had also arisen a new localized branch of the wardrobe system in the king's privy wardrobe of the Tower of London ; which was now to be of the utmost value as a place for the manufacture, assembly, storage and distribution of all manner of arms and artillery. It was now becoming an independent office, but it only gradually rose to that position, and was in its earlier history an offshoot, partly of the great wardrobe and partly of the chamber. How important these offices were in the first years of the war is to be seen from the fact that we derive from the records of the great and privy wardrobes and the chamber the earliest information that we have as to the beginnings of firearms and gunpowder.

In 1338 Edward III. betook himself to the Netherlands and remained abroad, with one short interval, until the latter part of 1340.

His plan to carry on the war while providing for the government of England in his absence was to divide his administration into two sections, one of which followed him abroad, and so far as practicable, attended him on his wanderings, while the other remained at home, charged not only with the daily administration, but with the raising of men and money for the war. The chancery, almost entirely, and the exchequer altogether stayed at home, and the chancellor and treasurer formed the heads of the council of regency, which ruled in the name of the little Duke of Cornwall. The privy seal and its office, enforced by a few chancery clerks, attended the king with its keeper, Kilsby. Kilsby, the most daring and enterprising of Edward's ministers, had, as receiver of the chamber, already done great things in the financial preparations for the war. But with Kilsby went the great seal, so that the king might upon occasion issue solemn as well as current letters, and the officer thus doubly empowered was so much the king's chancellor for practical purposes, that Kilsby is himself actually described as chancellor in documents issued in the Netherlands. The whole wardrobe went with the king: the great wardrobe moved from London to Antwerp, and the chamber, though divided, like the chancery, sent its best men abroad. The heads of all these offices formed, with the military magnates in the field, the king's council beyond sea, on whose advice the king was to rely just as the regent was guided by the council in London. It was a well thought-out scheme of division, and on the face of things there is no reason why it should not have worked.

There were fundamental difficulties which soon wrecked this plan of a dual ministry. Edward naturally expected to have the last word, and on the eve of his departure drafted the ordinance of Walton, a law whose importance has not been properly recognized, though it has been accessible in print for nearly two hundred years in Rymer's *Fœdera*. The Walton ordinance laid down that the chancery and exchequer at home should be strictly controlled by the king and his ministers abroad, and put this ultimate control under the direction of the king's chamber and privy seal. The special significance of the ordinance of Walton is in this frank exposition of a curialist policy, for the first time since the heyday of the Despensers. Now the ministry with the king was substantially the ministry of the courtiers, the household servants, whose one principle was to carry out the king's pleasure,

along with those barons, who, whatever their general line of policy might be, were so intent on the successful prosecution of the war, that they threw in their lot with the king's household servants. Contrariwise the ministry in England was controlled by the experienced officials brought up in the baronial traditions of the house of Lancaster. Naturally friction at once set up between two such different bodies. Edward had rushed abroad in such a hurry that he had not waited to levy the extraordinary taxes and the grants of wool which had been voted him for his enterprise. The ministry at home, mainly under the direction of the Stratfords, showed remissness in providing the king with funds, so that Edward could not satisfy the insatiable demands of his allies, and still less lead his own forces on an invasion of France. The king was thus reduced to helplessness, and was soon compelled to abandon the Walton policy. He made Stratford president of the Council, and gave him a free hand in ruling England. A liberal grant was made in return for these concessions, but the supplies were to be raised by special receivers out of all relation to the ordinary administration. But Edward's surrender was not sweetened by obtaining the support for which he had sacrificed everything. Compelled at last to abandon the campaign in despair, the king rushed over to England in November, 1340, intent at all costs on wreaking revenge on the traitors.

A contemporary chronicler, Robert of Avesbury, shrewdly describes the contest which followed as one between the king's *secretarii*, or confidants, and the ministers serving in the great offices of state. It was a plan, cleverly organized by William Kilsby, to transfer to the household followers of the crown the control of the public administration. It was within Edward's power to dismiss the ministers, and mete out imprisonment and penalties to the most guilty. The cry was raised that clerks who could not be tried in the king's courts were unworthy to be king's ministers, and a lay chancellor and treasurer were put into office. But Archbishop Stratford took sanctuary in his cathedral at Canterbury, and posed as a martyr in political sermons wherein he shrewdly combined the cause of the church with the cause of the constitution. The headstrong violence of the courtiers overshot the mark. When parliament met at Easter prelates, barons and commons rallied to the archbishop's cause. Edward had refused to summon the archbishop to parliament. An earl of ancient family expostulated indignantly with him. "Sir king," he cried, "how goes

this parliament? Parliaments were not wont to be like this. For here those who should be foremost are shut out, while men of lowly rank take their places." Thereupon the courtiers, with Kilsby at their head, quietly got up and abandoned their seats without saying a word. In this silent renunciation the courtiers abandoned the struggle. The archbishop came back; the "hereditary peerage" came into being as the solidest protection of the nation against prerogative; household administration had tried its best and failed.

The victorious parliament imposed hard terms on the king, terms so hard that he plucked up courage to refuse the most galling. As soon as the lords and commons had gone home he solemnly revoked his chief concessions, declaring that he had dissembled in order to obtain supplies for carrying on the national war. Two years later, another parliament condoned the king's arbitrary action by repealing the laws he had refused to carry out. For several years Edward's lay ministers continued in office, but their doings were in no way different from those of their clerical predecessors, and by 1345 the old system was fully restored. Thus the great crisis worked itself out. Its history remains of unique value to us because it emphasizes the contrast between household and public administration as nothing else does. It is in fact the one occasion on which there was a clear cut conflict between the two bodies. We have seen that it ended without a decided victory to either side. The stolid conservatism of fourteenth-century England frustrated in turn both the attempts of the king to ride roughshod over the constitution and the efforts of the magnates to set up a premature Whig oligarchy to which the king was to stand in the position of a doge. Neither undiluted household administration nor thoroughgoing baronial control were found in practice to be possible. The monarchy and the baronage had to live on side by side. The household officers became more conservative and prudent; the ministers of state took up an attitude hardly distinguishable from theirs. Edward realized that if he wanted to fight the French he had to keep the fighting and wealth-producing classes on his side. As a result the "double cabinet" passes out of mind, and some sort of unity of administration under the national king was restored.

The cessation of domestic conflict is well illustrated by the long tenure of power of bishop Edington of Winchester. First brought into prominence as the receiver of the ninth of 1340, Edington worked

his way through the king's wardrobe to the offices of treasurer and chancellor in succession. He remained a prominent officer of the crown continuously from 1340 to 1362, when increasing infirmities forbade his further continuance in power. He foreshadows the late mediæval type of political ecclesiastic which was later illustrated by his successors in the see of Winchester, Wykeham, Beaufort and Waynflete. For us he is especially important as indicating the gradual breaking down of the line that had at one time differentiated ministers of state and ministers of the court. Promotion from the household to the political offices had always been frequent; but it now became more than ever a matter of course, and the change of status had little effect on the policy of the promoted official. Happy results generally followed from the increasing unity of purpose among the servants of the crown. From our special point of view, it becomes increasingly easy to isolate administration from politics and study it by itself.

It was during Edington's long treasureship that a great blow was given to the system of household administration which was embodied in the revived chamber of the early thirties. This organization had acquired increased usefulness from the war, and an accession to its revenues from the proposed transference to it of the custody of the alien priories. But just as in 1322 with the contrariants lands, so with the alien priories in 1337, the original intention was never fully carried out. After the failure of prerogative in 1341, the chamber ceased to have much expansive power, though the reservation to it of lands continued until about the end of 1355. There is no evidence that there were any complaints against the system on the part of the public; but there is a continuous record of the hostility of the exchequer to its official rival. It may well be believed that the chamber had not fulfilled the hopes of its founders, that it was expensive to work, that it added little to the king's personal control of affairs, that it intensified departmental rivalry, and that it was simply an additional complication in an already somewhat elaborate and overlapping machinery. The appropriation to special collectors of war revenue had prevented it ever exercising a very wide activity, and the heightening of parliamentary control had rendered it comparatively useless. But the clear point is that, in 1356, as in 1322 and 1327, the chamber's worst enemy was the exchequer and that it was when a specially strong treasurer was in office that the *coup de grace* was given. This was contained in a

writ of 21 Jan., 1356, in which the king instructed treasurer Edington and his subordinates that all lands, tenements and other things previously reserved to the king's chamber should be reunited to the king's exchequer. The stewards and auditors of the chamber met this writ with prompt obedience, and all that they had now to do was to straighten out their accounts with the exchequer and disappear from history. With the chamber of lands went the griffin seal. All that remained of the chamber was the chamberlain's department of the household, subsidized by exchequer grants, devoted to the private and personal wants of the crown. The administrative chamber was so dead that even Richard II. never thought to revive it.

The expansion of the household for war purposes had not proved a great success. The parliamentary control over war expenditure tended in the long run to restrict the wardrobe of the household and also the great and privy wardrobes. A united administration was better for war purposes than a divided one, and there was no loss of efficiency in this restriction of household government and the restoration of chancery and exchequer to their old predominance. Yet the capacity of the household system to send out fresh offshoots was not yet exhausted. The griffin seal had disappeared but the secret seal of the chamber, kept in the custody of a chamber clerk, still remained available. It was wanted the more since in the latter days of Edward III. the privy seal had become absolutely officialized. It was already entirely gone "out of court," so that its officers received their pay from the exchequer and not from the wardrobe. Its head was well able to give independent advice to the king as was the chancellor or the treasurer. Accordingly, the future of household administration is now bound up with the secret seal. This stamp, after a period of diversified experiments, becomes permanently known as the king's *signet*. A new secretarial department arose out of the court for its custody, and an office of the signet with a staff of clerks was slowly evolved. The chief of these officers becomes gradually known as the *king's secretary*. Thus the word secretary, hitherto vaguely used in the sense of confidant, acquires for the first time an official sense. There are faint suggestions of this in the latter years of Edward III., and all through Richard II.'s reign the succession of the king's secretaries can be traced. In origin the private secretary of the king, the drafter, sealer and custodian of the monarch's private correspondence,

the secretary was soon to follow the course that had already been followed by the chancellor and keeper of the privy seal. He was to grow into the position of a secretary of state, a public minister. From the king's secretaryship arose in modern times the chief departmental ministries. With curious conservatism, the secretaries still keep the title which they first received when they were the king's private clerks. The seals of office, which they receive and resign on entering on and abandoning their posts, still represent the signets which the secretaries of Richard II. once kept for their master.

However much we may stress the future importance of the secretariat, we must recognize that soon after the middle of the century the antagonism of the rival ministries of household and state had for most purposes disappeared. The conditions which had emphasized such rivalry in 1340-41, and earlier at the chief turning points of the reign of Edward II. had now ceased to exist. This antagonism was based not only upon the eternal conflict between the court and the baronage, but on the circumstance of the ministries of state representing the baronial policy rather than that of the king. After the collapse of high prerogative in the early forties, the conflict of court and baronage had almost ceased to exist. Edward I. had bullied and coerced the magnates; Edward II. had kept aloof from them and given all his confidence to his favourites and household servants. All through his reign, Edward III. lived with his great nobles on friendly and cordial terms. They shared the same social life and were possessed by similar ambitions. The gracious geniality which was one of Edward III.'s strongest points attracted the nobles to his person and the easy-going opportunism, which sacrificed far policy to the interests of the moment, made it a simple thing for Edward to lavish on his nobles privileges and immunities which conciliated them for the time though it furnished their successors with weapons that made it possible for their descendants to challenge the authority of Edward's weak successors. Above all, the king and nobles had a common cause in the conduct of the great war against France. They were alike eager for military glory, for foreign conquest and the material spoils of war. To Edward the war was so much the primary object of his thoughts that he cheerfully bartered away his authority not only to the aristocracy but to the commons whose control of additional taxation made them to an increasing extent the ultimate arbiters of national policy. Under such

conditions it is hard to trace any clear continuance of the ancient struggle between court and magnates as had so long been conspicuous in early times. As a result of this the "two ministries" became blended in a harmonious whole. Any pressure of royal or baronial influence on the official class was applied equally to the ministers of the household and the ministers of state. The very distinction between those groups lost its meaning.

So long as Edward III. continued strong and active these conditions continued to prevail. Even after 1360, when the treaties of Breigny and Calais put an end for the time to the French war, there was still little symptom of the renewal of strife between crown and aristocracy. For one thing the peace was always nominal rather than real, and there was plenty of fighting in Brittany, in Normandy and in Spain to afford occupation for a martial royal house and an equally militant baronage. For another the formal peace was of short duration and in 1369 war broke out again. But by this time Edward III. had lost the extraordinary vitality of his youth and prime. Broken in health, infirm of purpose, absorbed in personal pleasures and incurious of the details of administration, the king had no longer the spirit to fight the barons, even if he had the wish to do so. A strong king, like Edward I., or a king with strong and bold advisers, like Edward II. in the days of the Despencers, or Edward III. in the days of Kilsby, was the essential element for such a conflict. With the decline of the physical energy of Edward III. we enter into a period of weak monarchy which outlasted the fourteenth century. With weak monarchy came the revival of aristocratic faction, and the chief political conflict for the rest of our period is the struggle of rival baronial parties. Only at certain periods of the reign of Richard II. was there any definite issue between the crown and the aristocracy.

On two occasions in the later part of Edward III.'s reign there is a suggestion that the conditions of 1340-41 were being renewed. These occasions were in 1371 and 1376. In the former year the barons and commons successfully petitioned the king to surpersede by laymen the clerical holders of the offices of chancellor, treasurer and keeper of the privy seal, as well as of other great offices. But the analogy between the two situations is very incomplete. The anti-clerical movement of 1371 was not, I believe, more than in appearance anti-clerical, and it made on distinction between the household and the official posts.

Moreover, the commons in 1371 made no attack on the crown and no distinction between the ministers of the household and the ministers of state. They repudiated any attempt to nominate ministers, being content to indicate to the king the type of minister which they preferred. Indeed it is probable that the king himself secretly sympathized with the parliamentary critics of his ministers. Even the anti-clerical cry was but a mask for the real issue, which was, I venture to think, the conduct of the war. In fact it was in essentials an effort of a warlike coterie of nobles to remove ministers suspected of not throwing their whole strength into the vigorous prosecution of the war. Beyond this no general administrative question was involved.

Five years later came the last crisis of the reign—the crisis that attended the session of the Good Parliament of 1376. Here important constitutional issues were raised, and the representatives of the Commons made their influence felt as it had never been felt before. Yet even in 1376 parliament had few proposals of a revolutionary character as regards the administration. Again it refused to nominate ministers and if it ultimately insisted on the appointment of a standing council, its object was to help the dying king by saving him from dishonest advisers and securing purity of administration. It left the chief ministers as it found them and was content with punishing individual offenders. It is true that the chief of these, Lord Latimer, was chamberlain and worked through agents closely connected with the chamber. But there is little evidence that there was any attempt to revive the chamber as such and thus restore direct household government. The king had become a negligible factor and John of Gaunt was only feeling his way to a policy of his own. There is even less suggestion than in 1371 of the old contrast between the two administrations. What was really important was the revival of aristocratic factions that resulted from the incompetence of the king. It was only after parliament ended that John of Gaunt closely identified himself with the scandalous camarilla of which Latimer was the chief. Undoubtedly John undid the work of the Good Parliament in the summer and autumn of 1376, and undoubtedly he used as his instrument a revived court party that might well have chosen to act through household channels. Yet his first and only success was in attuning the parliament of 1377 to his will. But John's triumph was short-lived and before the old king's death a revival of the aristocratic-clerical opposition, strongly supported by the

Londoners. Before the old king died the Duke of Lancaster had lost his paramount position in politics. A court leader was no true successor to the martyred Earl Thomas.

The reign of Richard II. is from our special point of view simply a continuation of the later years of Edward III. The minority of a boy king was even more favourable to the development of antagonistic factions among the magnates than the senility of his grandfather. This struggle of aristocratic factions is the chief domestic trouble for the rest of the fourteenth century. It is, however, diversified by a distinct revival of household administration as the king grew older, a movement illustrated by the growth of the secretariat and the increased use of the king's signet. It was, however, effectively checked by the Lords Appellant and it was only in 1397, when Richard made his bold attempt at despotism that the conditions of 1341 were renewed. But a more complete triumph than Edward III. had ever obtained was followed within three years by the deposition of the autocrat. From the Lancastrian revolution arose a permanent baronial control over administration that rendered futile any attempt to set up an interior royal cabinet of confidants against the accredited ministers of state. Household administration, though it had failed as a general control, remained useful in a limited sphere and was still the source of new administrative experiments. The one strong Lancastrian king, Henry V., waged war in France through his household machinery much as Edward III. had done in his earlier years. When, nearly two generations later, Edward IV. and the early Tudors once more restored the monarchy on a solid basis, they exercised much of their power through a revival of household administration.

It is more than time to abandon this attempt to trace chronologically the struggle of the conflicting tendencies of offices of the household and the offices of state during the later fourteenth century. It has, however, incidentally brought out some other analogous lines of contrast and comparison with which we may now proceed briefly to deal. One has already been touched upon, the conflict of lay and clerical ministries. This is apparent in 1340-41 and in 1371, and to some extent all through the reign of Richard II. But it is easy to make too much of it, as I suspect both Stubbs and Maitland did. Kilsby, who raised the cry in 1340, was a cleric who was striving hard to be an archbishop, and there was an element of insincerity in an agitation so equi-

vocally represented. In 1371 the anti-clerical cry was but a pretext for getting rid of experienced ministers who had shown some lack of energy in the conduct of the renewed French War. In either case the courtiers did not object to clerks because of their clergy; their only complaint was that the immunity of the clergy from the civil courts made it very difficult for the king to execute, imprison or deprive of his property anyone enjoying the privileges of the clerical order. There was never any objection to the lower staffs of the government offices being reserved to clerks. Both after 1340 and after 1371 lay chancellors ran their offices through an exclusively clerical staff of clerks of the chancery. Similarly the lay keeper of the privy seal, after 1371, had to work through a purely clerical staff of subordinates. The exchequer, and the exchequer only, remained up to the end of the century the office on which laymen and clergy met together on equal terms. But by that period we have laymen gradually coming into their own. Nevertheless, the government of England remained largely, we may say mainly, in clerical hands until the Reformation.

We must not be over anxious to see a sort of incipient anti-clericalism in this laicising movement. It is rather due to the spread of education in lay society. By the fourteenth century there had grown up at least two types of lay education that owed nothing to the clerical universities. There was the education of the court which could produce a lay man of the wide cultivation of a Geoffrey Chaucer, himself a representative of the lay official type. Above all these was the growth of schools of the common law in London, which resulted from the demand for a practical training in the common law of the realm, as administered in the courts, for which the universities, which only recognized civil and canon law, made no provision. The result was that, while under Edward I. a large proportion of common lawyers were ecclesiastics, the clerical common lawyer and the clerical judge became almost obsolete in the course of the reign of Edward III. When the commons of 1371 petitioned that the clerk of the privy seal should be a layman, they were officially giving the wider significance to the term clerk with which we moderns are more familiar. In fact a clerk not in holy orders had only one great privilege, the enjoyment of "benefit of clergy," and that immunity the educated layman was henceforth to share with him. The conflict of layman and clerk was much more in evidence in the still abiding antagonism of church and state than in

the struggle between the lay and clerical servants of the state for office and emoluments. Nobody now believes that Philip the Fair laid low the power of the papacy when he hounded Boniface VIII. to his death and, in effect, transferred the Roman court from Italy to Avignon where it soon became largely officered by Frenchmen. Never was the Roman court more active than during this period, and all over Christendom the clerically trained lawyer of the universities found both a legal and an administrative career in every bishopric and archdeaconry as well as in the service of the state. The modern historian has made much of the mediæval conflicts between church and state : but it is possible to overstress them. The ecclesiastical and lay jurisdictions were not engaged in perpetual struggles with each other. Such disputes were the exception rather than the rule. A broad survey suggests that normally the two powers worked together with a fair amount of harmony in the common task of governing an unruly and rebellious generation. In this general acceptance by each side of its rival's position we see the explanation of the paradox that the Avignon papacy, though bending to some extent before the nationalist storm in its dealings with the kings of France and of England, imposed its administrative system over all Christendom in a way that the great popes of earlier times have never aspired to do.

The development of administration meant centralisation of power under a single ruler. But the mediæval prince lived a life of perpetual wandering, and so long as he ruled his realm through his household, the central authority itinerated with the monarch. As the machine of state became more complex, it became increasingly difficult for the administrative machine to follow the court from place to place. There arose accordingly the need of a capital, of a fixed abiding place for the government offices. The natural place for this localisation of government was in the chief city of the land, and London was even more clearly the chief city of England than Paris was the chief city of France. Accordingly by the days of Henry II. the exchequer found a permanent home at Westminster, and the Great Charter by providing that the common bench should have a fixed seat, secured its normal establishment also at Westminster. But when the principal ambition of the English kings became the subjugation of Scotland, York was a more convenient centre for the offices of state than the great city of the south. From the time of Edward I. to the outbreak of the Hundred

Years War the chief departments were constantly removed to York, as, for instance, between 1333 and 1338. Their long absence plunged Westminster into dire poverty. But relief came after 1338 when the exchequer and the common bench, and with them councils and parliaments, went back to Westminster, which for the future became their permanent abode. Even the chancery, though still partly itinerant, had now its normal "place" in Westminster Hall, while its officials and records were often located on the western verge of the city. Other offices established themselves in the Tower, where the king's chamber, privy wardrobe, mint and exchanges now had their headquarters. After 1340 the great wardrobe established its permanent home within the city itself.

Another conflicting tendency was that between the local and central administrations. While the central authority was all vested in the crown, the local agents of the sovereign were everywhere hampered by seigniorial, municipal, ecclesiastical and corporate immunities. The ancient local government had largely been in the hands of the shire and hundred courts, which stood in the faintest relations to the monarchy and had become, in effect, controlled by the magnates of the district. Not only did the great franchises break up administrative unity : a widespread minor immunity such as "return of writs" forbade the direct execution of royal orders by the normal agents of the crown in a large part of the land. Worse than all, the traditional local mouth-pieces of the royal will, the sheriffs, escheators, coroners, and their like, were in practice no seneschals or prefects, creatures of the central state, but local potentates more amenable to the feeling of their neighbourhood than to the wishes of their master. Moreover, the justice administered in the local courts was become old-fashioned, stiff and arbitrary.

Edward III. took full advantage of the decay of the local courts to increase the control of the central power over every part of his realm. His greatest success was in the consolidation of the office of justice of the peace. The justices of the peace were royal servants, appointed by the king's commission and empowered to do for the lower ranges of jurisdiction what the judges of assize had long done for its higher aspects. Like the sheriffs, they were not meant to represent local interests but the interests of the crown. The original commissions were issued to a strictly limited number of persons, appointed to act in a particular shire. In most instances the commission was headed by a

magnate of the shire and a few carefully selected colleagues, chosen for their experience, substance, and legal knowledge. In short, the original justices of the peace were neither the numerous, the unskilled, nor the unpaid justices that more recent history is familiar with. Nor were their functions purely judicial but included from the beginning an administrative element, so that the justices of a shire in their quarter sessions were gradually to replace the old shire moot as the administrative authority of the county. Another organisation of the same type arose in the commissions appointed under the statute of labourers to carry out the order that wages and prices should both be maintained at the level at which they had been before the Black Death of 1348-1349. It is often said that mediæval laws were recognitions of an ideal rather than enactments designed to be executed. But the fact that an American scholar can set forth in a large volume the detailed efforts made within the first decade after its enactment to carry out the statute of labourers shows that no effort was spared in this case to make the law effective. After 1359 the commissions of the peace and of labourers were combined in the same hands, so that the resultant authority had very full administrative powers.

Nor were these the only measures to strengthen the local execution of the law. The vexed problem of the correct sphere of the escheators' functions was settled in the early forties by making the escheatorship coterminous with the sheriffdom. Other encroachments on local freedom—especially in the economic sphere—were illustrated by the growth of the staple system. Repeated experience had shown that a single staple abroad secured an undesirable monopoly for the foreigner, while unlimited freedom of export imposed obstacles in the way of collecting the king's customs revenue which were unthinkable in a period of constant war. A final settlement so far as England was concerned was effected in 1353 when the Ordinance of the Staple set up ten privileged towns in England and others in Wales and Ireland, whence alone export of staple commodities could be made. From that year a staple corporation, nominated by the crown, watched over the market at each staple town and provided machinery for controlling commerce, raising revenue and attracting the specie of the foreigners who came to buy English wool or tin.

Thus from several points of view, the crown accroached to itself jurisdiction over the local authorities. But in the long run its gain

appeared much less than might have been expected. It is true that the crown succeeded in defeating the popular demand for the election of sheriffs in the shire courts, and that the commons' demand that justices of the peace should be appointed in parliament by the representatives of the shires concerned was never accepted. But indirectly the local landlords became the agents of the royal authority. The sheriffs, appointed annually, became typical local gentry : the royal justices of the peace became in fact the organs of local landed opinion ; the staple organization became absorbed by the municipalities and strengthened the already great advances otherwise made by the towns towards local autonomy. If there were from one point of view a strong tendency towards monarchical centralization, the necessity of the crown acting through agents, whose interests were more local than national, wrested from the king most of the fruits of his new efforts. There was a central bureaucracy, but not a local one. Receiving the king's commission, and transacting the king's business when not employed on his own affairs, did not deflect the local agent of the crown from remaining mainly mindful of the local point of view. The local corporation or magnate who received the king's mandate to act for him soon regarded it as a matter of indifference that his authority was based upon a royal commission. The king might give, but he could seldom take away a gift once given. The hard conditions of the times forced upon Edward III. to undo with one hand what he was fastening up with the other. The constant exigencies of war and finance, and a certain rashness and irresponsibility of temper forced him in practice to adopt a shallow opportunism which prevents us claiming for him other general policy than an intelligent pursuit of his own personal interests.

It follows that we have to consider another of the conflicting administrative tendencies of the time. Parallel with the movement towards strengthening the central state, there was a long series of grants of concessions and franchises to the magnates that sometimes rivalled the concessions to the aristocracy made by the early Valois kings of France. Early in the reign Archbishop Stratford had suggested to the king the subtle policy of conciliating the magnates by extraordinary grants. Though Edward afterwards reproached Stratford for this traitorous advice, he did not fail to carry it out. New sheriffdoms for life or fee were made until the commons' complaints stopped the practice.


But the ranks of the higher aristocracy were steadily depleted by death and the union of the hitherto distinct families, and the result was to increase the individual influence of the chief survivors. The union of the houses of Fitzalans and Warenne is a case in point. The immense power that was gradually bestowed on the house of Lancaster is a still more conspicuous instance of the same tendency. At last in 1351, Henry, Earl of Lancaster, was created Duke of Lancaster for life, and his newly made duchy became permanent when his daughter brought it as her wedding portion to Edward III.'s favourite son, John of Gaunt. In 1376 the duchy was fully equipped as a palatine jurisdiction, with a chancellor and justices of its own, and with all other royal rights "as truly as the Earl of Chester is known to have them in Cheshire." From that time the lands of the Duke of Lancaster become as much an exception to the ordinary law as the lands of the heir apparent in Cheshire, Cornwall and Wales. Such grants were not to be excused by their limitation to the king's near kinsmen, for the earlier history of the house of Lancaster had shown that the king's closest relatives were the natural leaders of the opposition. The policy was the more fatal since every great territorial magnate was now striving to bind together his scattered estates under a single administrative system, through which he hoped to do for them what the king was trying to do for the kingdom at large. For the moment such a concentration of power might make it easier for the Black Prince or the Duke of Lancaster to raise armies to fight the French and to finance them to some extent from their own resources. The whole history of the fifteenth century shows that the ultimate result of the policy was a growth of faction and a weakness of the central power that reduced the fifteenth century monarchy to a level that prevented it maintaining order and peace in a land split up by rival aristocratic feuds. When, in earlier times, the barons had combined against the king, in later years they made rival claims to the crown a pretext for fighting each other.

The organization of the domains of the Black Prince and of the dukes of Lancaster have not yet been studied with sufficient thoroughness to make it safe to form facile generalizations about them. But it is interesting to note how their methods were parallel to those of the crown, and how they aspired to have a single organization, centring in some cases in London, rather than to establish themselves firmly in

some one district and strive to shut it off from the realm. There was the Prince of Wales' wardrobe in London, and the Duke of Lancaster's wardrobe in the Savoy Palace in the Strand, a palace which excited the wonder of contemporaries who declared that there was nothing else like it in England. Such things are significant of the attraction which was centralizing even the aristocracy in London rather than in their country castles. But the chief examples of aristocratic centralization were those of members of the royal family, and such estates were eminently liable to be absorbed in the crown. This was the case with the duchy of Lancaster when John of Gaunt's son became King Henry IV. This was the case even with non-royal agglomerations, when the estates of ancient houses were acquired by marriage for younger sons of the royal house. Thus, Henry of Bolingbroke and Thomas of Woodstock divided the lands of the Bohuns, and the transmission of the enormous Mortimer estates in Wales and its March to the male line of the most impecunious of the sons of Edward III. made it possible for the house of York to dethrone the house of Lancaster. Thus we have more than a suggestion of a British counterpart of the "regional nationalities" which in France and the Empire were borrowing the methods of monarchical centralization to deprive the monarchy of its power. At least we have in our island a more perfect instance of this tendency than even Brittany or Flanders. Scotland attained within a generation the independence which Brittany lost and which Flanders only won slowly and imperfectly.

Such were the conflicting tendencies manifested in the history of administration in fourteenth-century England. Household offices and national offices of state, lay and clerical administration, central concentration under the crown supplemented by local centralization in a fixed capital, the subjection of feudal franchises to the central authority and the constant creation of new immunities that broke up the unitary ideal of strong monarchy, the supersession of local courts responsible to the localities by officials appointed by the crown, the growth of municipal independence increasingly unrelated to the government of the districts in which the towns were imbedded, all these and many other things also may be studied side by side. Even in stating these contrasts we must not over emphasize them. Nothing works out to its logical result, and one tendency is successfully counteracted by another. The historian who would state all these things too clearly is always exposed to a

double danger. In avoiding the Scylla of hasty generalization, he is always liable to fall into the Charybdis of a mass of incoherent detail. If he states his case in too broad terms, he may well read modern ideas into mediæval conditions. If he prudently abstains from more than a statement of the detail that he knows, he is denounced for indulging in mere antiquarianism. He can only do his best to swim through a sea, where alternate currents drive him now in this direction now in another. He may perhaps console himself, if he turns from the past to the present, by reflecting that even the civilized world of to-day is beset with contradictory tendencies equally incoherent.



MEDIÆVAL AND MODERN WARFARE

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A LECTURE

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BY

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UNIVERSITY OF MANCHESTER

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1919

MEDIÆVAL AND MODERN WARFARE.¹

BY T. F. TOUT, M.A., F.B.A.

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IT is not easy after more than four years of universal warfare for even those whose lives are consecrated to mediæval study to fix their attention upon a period that is at first sight so remote from all practical interest as the middle ages. It seems almost inhuman to dwell upon the petty doings of dead and gone centuries when the world in which we live has been struggling painfully and slowly against the danger of a new invasion of the barbarians, which has destroyed infinite treasures of the past, and at one time threatened altogether to overwhelm the highest civilisation. If we have kept alive our intellectual interests through such a time, we have been sorely tempted to occupy ourselves with the present, or at least with the comparatively recent past, which throws direct light on present conditions. It is true that we talk much of our educational deficiencies, and of the need for educational reconstruction. And in that reconstruction the muse of history may perchance come into more of her own than has been allowed her in the traditions of the pedagogues. But there is a danger that she will win her way to recognition not so much by reason of her own charm as because of her imagined practical value. Short cuts to results may be generally regarded to be the only roads for the practical man to pursue. Why trouble about the remote past, when the nearer ages can alone be expected to give us any direct light in dealing with the problems of the present? It is significant of this trend of thought that a government committee, including several honoured and respectable names, should have agreed to recommend that the subject of mediæval European history should be forbidden to count in favour of a candidate for a high position in the British Civil Service.

¹ A Lecture delivered at the John Rylands Library, the 12th of December, 1917.



It has now been for several years my privilege to discourse before this audience on some of the lighter aspects of mediæval history. If there be any connecting idea running through these lectures, it is perhaps to be found in an effort to suggest that the problems of the middle ages were not altogether dissimilar from those of our own days, and that there is instruction and entertainment, perhaps even a glimpse of practical utility, in envisaging the ways in which mediæval man has grappled with questions that in our pride we are prone to imagine as exclusively modern. Thus, on one occasion, an attempt was made to show the affinities between the mediæval rogue and his modern counterpart, on another to suggest that the all-pervading bureaucracy of our latest age had its origin in the mediæval civil servant, and on a third that the town planners of modern times had their forerunners in the designers of the new towns of the middle ages. It is another aspect of the same idea, if on this occasion I ask you to listen to what I have to say about mediæval warfare, and that for three reasons. The first is because war has perforce filled our minds nowadays and will continue to do so till the hoped for peace has been agreed upon and carried into practice all over the world. The second is because mediæval man was so emphatically a fighter, that the warrior of those days must have a special interest to a generation forced to turn to arms, not for love of fighting, but because it had to fight or go under. The third is because, if we can turn our minds to distant themes at all, it requires a less violent effort of will to consider the middle ages in their fighting aspect, and to ask ourselves to what extent the military conditions of that period throw light upon the all-engrossing warfare of the last five years.

We must not hastily dismiss the possibility of such inquiries having no useful result. We must not range ourselves with those over-practical people who will cull no fruit from the tree of knowledge which is not immediately ripe for their own consumption. We have suffered in the past from our lack of science, and from that tyranny of the amateur which has resulted from the absence of sound knowledge. We should be reforming our education in the very spirit of the self-satisfied Philistine, if we refused to interrogate any period of history for the lessons which it may suggest to us. And above all, we must never cease to recognise the intimate ties that connect the middle ages with modern civilisation. "We are what we are," once wrote a learned French-

man, "because of the middle ages." If a modern Frenchman can say this how much more can a modern Englishman, whose land has never witnessed such an effort to break from the past as the era of the Revolution and Napoleon saw in all western continental lands? Most of our own institutions are mediæval in their origin and impulse, and can only be understood in the light of the middle ages. Our parliaments, our administrative system, our monarchy, our religion, our language and literature, our national ideals were all moulded in the middle ages. How far can we say the same of our military institutions?

Before we go any farther we must to some extent limit our field. We must not speak of either mediæval or of modern warfare, as if it were all the same. Every age had its own form of warfare, both in mediæval and modern times. There was all the difference in the world between the pure "battles of kites and crows" of petty feudal warfare, and the orderly and scientific campaigns of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. There is an equal difference between earlier results of the art of war and the warfare of a Cromwell and a Gustavus, a Turenne and a Marlborough, and between these and the warfare of Frederick the Great and Napoleon. The recent war differs in many essential respects from all the wars of history, both as regards its colossal scale, its immensity of equipment, and its tactical methods. Compared with it all previous wars are "ancient history," the campaigns of Moltke, the American Civil war and the Boer war as much as those of Hannibal and Cæsar, the Black Prince, and Henry V. Yet underlying all warfare which is waged by human intelligence as conscious work of science or art, there are certain eternal principles of military operations which are the same for one age as for another. Even the tactics by which the general aim is secured, though varying necessarily from generation to generation, show from time to time a tendency to revert to types that have long been condemned as obsolete.

I speak, of course, only of "scientific" or deliberate warfare in which good brains seek out the best means to secure a definite aim which is, of course, the defeat or the destruction of the enemy. Modern conditions make all recent warfare between civilised communities approximate to this type. It makes warfare less common, but it renders it much more terrible whenever it is waged. But before the organisation of destruction has attained this level, there are at least two stages

which the history of warfare has to traverse. The first of these is the stage when warfare of a sort is almost permanent, and when as a result we have a condition of things not far removed from Hobbes' "State of Nature" when the life of man is "nasty, brutish, and short". This was the case during the "Dark Ages" that preceded the dawn of mediæval civilisation, the time when the whole West was exposed to the predatory incursions of barbarian invaders, Northmen, Saracens, Slavs, and Magyars, and when imperfect salvation from this was to come from a state of society in which every petty magnate levied incessant war against his neighbour. In those days every man had to till his fields with arms in his hands, had to dwell behind strong walls on some inconvenient hill-top, far from his work, and was ever exposed to sudden and unprovoked attack. Yet this warfare was waged on so small a scale, the warrior's motive so seldom went beyond plunder, outrage, and revenge that this chronic fighting did little to affect the course of history, though much to perpetuate a degraded state of society. It was the effort to put an end to those purposeless affairs of blood that resulted in the beginnings of studied and motivated warfare in modern times. These first took the shape of the mail-clad feudal horseman, as the chief instrument of offence, and the impregnable stone-built feudal castle, as the essential instrument of defence. With the perfection of these instruments in the eleventh and twelfth centuries we are at the beginnings of the mediæval art of war.

Feudal warfare still largely depended on mere physical strength and courage. All that primitive military art did, was to select a doughty warrior, put him on a strong horse, equip him with sword, shield, and spear, and protect him, and ultimately his horse also with armour fashioned out of chains or plaques of iron or steel. Primitive tactics centred in the rush of the mail-clad cavalry, whose sheer weight overbore opposition and won the day. But by the thirteenth century a progressive, intelligent, and more resourceful society arose which supplanted these simple evolutions by a system which was to last for the rest of the middle ages. This was the system whose faint beginnings are seen at Courtrai, Morgarten, and Bannockburn and which came to perfection in the campaigns waged by Edward III and Henry V against the French during the so-called Hundred Years' War. All of these campaigns were fought on French soil. Some of them were waged on parts of the same ground between the Flemish coast and the land

of Champagne on which French and English have been fighting the Germans from 1914 to 1918. It will be convenient, then, if we illustrate the lessons that we are to draw from mediæval warfare, from operations which have in common the same conditions of terrain, just as naturally as we must go to the events recently unrolled before our eyes to illustrate the conditions of modern warfare. Let us attempt a comparison between the two, which will be largely, but will not be wholly a series of contrasts.

At first sight the contrast between the methods and manner of mediæval and modern warfare are so overwhelming that it seems a paradox to put them side by side with each other. Nowadays the state of war is exceptional ; then it was almost chronic. Then men fought with limited appliances, and on a ridiculously small scale, battles which, even when victories on the field, seldom led to a final decision. Now the unlimited material resources of modern science and industry are ransacked to enable armies millions strong to contend against each other for decisive victory. It is because of the vast demands made by modern warfare that it is generally of brief duration, the more so since such fighting on a huge scale easily brings out any decisive superiority of one combatant over another. When the present war began most people here, and in Germany, were convinced it would be over in a few weeks. But for the victory at the Marne it certainly would have been finished by Christmas, 1914, and finished by the complete triumph of Germany over her continental enemies, leaving us, as in Napoleon's time, to continue our resistance alone, so long as we could keep off invasion by retaining the command of the sea. Events soon demonstrated that substantial equality between the two opposing hosts which the wise foresaw. From that arose the necessity for a long struggle. Yet even in the days of our worst depression, in the days of the comparative failure of the Western offensive and the debacle in Russia, we can still feel sure that the fight could not last for many more years. Nowadays a Thirty Years' War is as unthinkable as a Hundred Years' War. Our four years' war was long enough in all conscience. Yet till the late summer of 1918 who could say with conviction that a seven years' war was still impossible? How few suspected that the mighty German military machine would ever tumble to pieces all at once like a house of cards? Of all the historical marvels of our age nothing will strike the historian as so

wonderful as the sudden collapse of Germany. Our enemies sought the truce of Martinmas, 1918, because they knew well that a few weeks more fighting would have exposed them to a military disaster unprecedented in all history.

The small scale of mediæval warfare was the compensation over the almost chronic state of war which then prevailed. In those days fighting was so much an incident of daily life that every free man had to possess weapons and had to know how to use them. Yet there was no standing army in any country in Europe. Save for a small governing class and its retainers, no man was a warrior by trade. The mediæval man "did his bit," as we said a year ago, and he went to do it straight from the plough or the shop, with a minimum of drilling and preliminary preparation. He fought well because fighting was in the blood, but he fought with little science and in a traditional way. He soon wearied of warfare and went gladly home to his daily task. He was an amateur, not a professional. Even the land-holding class was amateurish, sharing with its modern counterpart a fondness for hunting, shooting, and racing, and having also a taste which moderns have lost, since the decay of duelling, for the game of fighting, notably in the tournament, which, though illegal, was as common as prize fighting was a hundred years ago, and much more reputable. But the knight and squire of the middle ages had seldom turned his mind to serious military problems. He fought like a gentleman, because to fight gallantly was part of a gentleman's natural business and pleasure. He, therefore, fought in a gentlemanly way, respecting his opponent, especially if he belonged to his own class. He was capable of great ferocity when his blood was up or his sense of fairplay outraged. Too often he set little store on shedding the puddle blood of the lower classes. Yet normally he was, like the Turk of military legend, a "clean fighter". He behaved in the field in a chivalrous fashion. He was strictly obedient to the traditional "rules of the ring". Thus, though he condemned stratagems and tricks as unsportsmanlike he was sometimes reduced to indulging in them. But a "fair field and no favour" was what the ardent warrior most desired. It followed that the real battle often tended to approach the mimic battle of the tournament.

Even in those days the honest warrior did not always get what he expected. The serious spirit of scientific warfare made light of these childish devices of the war game. And there was a business side

even to the chivalrous warrior. He was proud to treat his imprisoned foe with the courtesy and consideration that, for instance, the Black Prince showed to the captive King John after Poitiers. But one reason for this forbearance was the great fact that distinguished prisoners could be ransomed at a high price. To maltreat the prisoner, then, was literally to kill the goose that laid the golden eggs.

We may illustrate the conflict of chivalry and business from the first invasion of northern France by Edward III in 1339, when he marched from the Netherlands southwards up the Scheldt to Cambrai and then to Saint-Quentin and the Somme and thence to the Oise valley beyond, a route very similar to that taken by the Germans in 1914, and a route that in the autumn of 1918 our troops traversed in the reverse way. Fearing to hazard everything in a pitched battle, the King of France prudently shut himself up within the strong walls of Saint-Quentin. The English grew irritated that the usurper was not playing the game. They fastened scraps of parchment, on which insulting messages were written, to the arrows which they shot over the walls of the king's refuge, challenging him to come out and fight like a man. These taunts made King Philip so ashamed of himself that he wrote to Edward, offering him battle the very next Thursday on any ground that was not strengthened by wood, marsh, or water, on ground, in short, where one army was as good as the other and where the defensive tactics, for which the English were already renowned, could gain little advantage. The English took the French at their word and long stood at arms on an appropriate spot. They were bitterly disappointed when the French did not keep their promise, and angrily retired to their starting point, convinced that even if they had failed to conquer a rood of French land, they had proved themselves to be the better men. Their attitude reminds one of the boasts of German spokesmen nowadays that Germany has not been beaten. The French derived a more reasonable satisfaction from the retirement of their enemy. They have defeated the invasion without having to fight for it, just as French and English have occupied western Germany by reason of the greatest military collapse in all history.

The same chivalrous spirit produced such episodes as the famous *combat des trente*, the serious tournament of thirty knights aside of the English and French factions in Brittany. It inspired the constant challenges to single combat on the part of the leaders of the contending

hosts, challenges that never by any chance were accepted by either side in the spirit in which they were offered.

The age of chivalry died slowly away. It was reflected so late as Shakespeare's time in the speech of the finicking courtier who regretted to Hotspur the unsportsmanlike use of gunpowder and its unfair tendency to lay low many a pretty fellow in a sneaking and cowardly fashion and urged that the existence of these "vile guns" had prevented him from adopting the soldiers' trade. We see it surviving in the eighteenth century when, as the story goes, French and English at Fontenoy politely dispute as to which side was to accept the honour of shooting first. It shines through the very disputable doctrine that Waterloo was won on the playing fields of Eton. It lives on still in the spirit which held up the Germans to scorn for hiding away their iron-clads in a ditch, when gallant seamen ought to have come out to the open North Sea and received their natural fate from our gallant tars. The spirit that sent rude messages into Saint-Quentin in 1339 inspired the other day the placards boasting of victories or the challenges to a fair fight, which diversified for the rank and file the monotony of modern trench warfare.

These unreasonable yet natural impulses are survivals merely. It was in vain that Hague conventions and other well-meaning attempts were made to keep alive traditions of forbearance, fair-play, and mutual courtesy. The present struggle has seen war revealed in all its naked hideousness. The refusal of our enemies to regard as binding on themselves rules, which they profess to regard as binding on others, has destroyed, perhaps for ever, the time-honoured conventions that made war tolerable to the moral consciousness because they mitigated some of its horrors.

It follows that modern warfare has become infinitely more cruel and inhuman than the warfare of the middle ages. Deeds of cunning and violence, once mainly done in hot blood, are now done deliberately and consciously. On the principle that all is justified that secures the end desired, this appeal to naked and unashamed force is logical enough. The serious business of war is to win by killing or frightening your enemies. Why be squeamish about killing in any particular way when after all you are out to kill? The conventions of war are in short quite illogical; but man cannot live on logic alone, and their disappearance makes it harder for the modern soldier to preserve his self-

respect and love of fair play. Fortunately the higher impulses of human nature are very hard to suppress, and when modern conditions allow something approximating to the old-fashioned duel of man against man, the age of chivalry is not yet dead. A recognised instance is the mutual respect and forbearance shown for each other by the warriors of the air, when engaged in real fighting along the battle lines. Here something like single combat is still possible ; here courage, imagination, and individual initiative still have full play. Though air fighting is perhaps the most deadly form of modern warfare, it does not fail to bring out the best traditions on both sides of the ancient spirit of honourable rivalry.

The crushing out of the chivalrous side of modern warfare is the more regrettable since two recent developments of the art of war have brought back conditions approximately much more nearly to those of the middle ages than were the conditions of fighting a couple of generations ago. These are the revival of national as opposed to professional service, and the still more recent recrudescence of hand-to-hand fighting on a colossal scale. Let us take these points in turn. Both show how history moves in circles as much as on straight lines.

I have said already that mediæval warfare was mainly amateur and modern warfare mainly professional. But amateur service is, as every country but England knows, semi-competent service, and as conditions grow complex the amateur is more and more at a disadvantage. Accordingly there is all through the later middle ages a strong tendency towards eliminating the unskilled fighter and putting the professional soldier in his place. The national obligation on all citizens to fight for their country is doubtless a very fine ideal, but under mediæval conditions it meant the incompetent service of a mob of untrained and ineffective men. It was this undisciplined crowd which had failed to resist the Danish invasions. Feudalism provided a temporary remedy when it gave a limited number of expert warriors the right of holding lands, adequate for their support, on condition of providing trained and equipped soldiers on a limited but adequate scale. But this host of armed landholders broke down, when wars became more complicated and prolonged. The warrior class became first of all landholders and only secondarily soldiers. It followed that kings, like Edward I, found that it was labour in vain to wage wars through the feudal levies. They first tried to encourage their official warriors by allowing a certain

proportion of the feudal levies to undertake to serve for the whole. Finally Edward I found that he had to pay such of the knights and barons as were willing to fight his wars under more professional conditions. The special needs of prolonged warfare beyond seas under Edward III compelled the English crown to employ a small, well-equipped, professional army, levied, when war arose, either by contracting with leading nobles to supply a certain force for a certain rate of pay, or by compulsory levies of infantry from counties and towns. It was chiefly the troops raised by contracts which formed the host which won immortal glory at Crecy and Agincourt, and which represents almost the last word in mediæval military efficiency. But even then there was no standing army. When peace was made every man went back to his old business or, if he had none, robbed on the highway, or sold his sword to some foreign prince.

Modern history repeats in this matter the lesson of mediæval history. The victories of Cromwell, of Turenne, of Marlborough, of Frederick of Prussia, and of Napoleon were the triumphs of a limited army of highly trained professional warriors, men of the same type as our "contemptible little army" which played its part in staying the German invasion of France in 1914. It is true that French's warriors in 1914 were volunteers, while all the eminent generals I have mentioned (not excepting Cromwell) commanded armies of pressed men. But history shows there is next to nothing in the traditional British doctrine that one volunteer is worth three pressed men. If your conscript is trained, and has faith in his cause, he leaves nothing to be desired as a soldier. But up to the last century armies remained on so small a scale that even the Napoleonic Empire was content to utilise a mere proportion of the possible food for powder offered by the obligation of compulsory military service. It is only in our own age that this compulsion has become a universal one, and how well the ordinary citizen has risen to this new and onerous obligation has been revealed to us by every stage of the war. But the citizen soldier has to be trained, and in the perfection of his training you have the modern miracle of the armies of to-day, consisting of many millions of men, showing the skill, the courage, and the discipline of the modest professional armies of history. We may safely pay this tribute to all the western armies, to the French, to ourselves, to the Italians, to the Americans, and, as common fairness compels us to allow, to the

Germans, whose magnificent recovery after the Cambrai surprise compelled our admiration, however much it provoked our misgivings. It is in this diversion of the whole manhood of great nations to the necessary but unprofitable trade of war that suggests the most serious alarms for the future, the most urgent need of stopping the horrid business once for all by making the impending settlement as favourable as human frailty allows to liberty and progress. But of one thing western democracy can feel quite sure. Its soldiers, when war is over, will gladly be reabsorbed in the civil population. There will be no danger of free men who know what war is wishing to introduce militarism into their own land. Even less likely are they to find new Cromwells or Napoleons from their leaders.

Thus the wheel of history goes round, and the latest revolution shows the revival of the *fyrdbot* of our Anglo-Saxon ancestors, made more onerous for ourselves by the colossal scale and the immense mechanical equipment of modern armies. Another result of the same tendency is a curious revulsion, at least on the part of the Germans, to the old doctrine which drew little distinction between combatants and non-combatants. In primitive times the victor slew, tortured, and enslaved at his discretion the whole enemy population, men, women, and children alike. With the growth of professional and limited armies, the more comfortable doctrine arose that fighting was to be limited to the fighting class, and that the civil population, provided always that it stood aside and took no part in any hostilities, was to be spared as much as possible the horrors of war. If civilians were slain, it was a regrettable accident or an inevitable result of warlike conditions. If property were molested, save so far as was needful to supply the combatants with food, equipment, and means of defence and offence, it was a cruel and wanton violation of the humanities of civilised warfare. These ideals were not always carried out, but their existence as ideals had some restraining influence upon the ordinary general. How often have historians denounced in chorus the barbarous devastation of the Palatinate by Louis XIV ! How often have we heard strong reprobation of Napoleon's harsh act in throwing into prison the harmless tourists who had flocked over to France after the treaty of Amiens to worship at his shrine ! What indignation was felt in France against the Spanish *guerilleros* who murdered all stragglers from the imperial armies during the Peninsular War ! How

fierce was the German feeling against the *franc tireur* of 1870, who dared to defend his invaded country even without the sanction of a uniform coat and a place in a regular unit ! But nowadays these traditional mitigations of the savageries of warfare were regarded by our enemies as binding upon Englishmen and Frenchmen, and quite negligible by the glorious Teuton whose higher civilisation makes him a law to himself. The wholesale internment of civilians, the bombardment of unfortified towns, notably by air-craft, the virtual enslavement and deportation of the conquered populations, are but a few familiar instances of this increasing brutality of warfare. The theories of a Clausewitz have been translated into acts by his disciples. This is the more lamentable, since the other side was practically compelled to follow the example of its enemies.

The same process has been worked out on sea as on land. At sea there was never the same line drawn between the militant and the non-fighting elements. In the middle ages there was no "royal navy" at all ; if the king owned a few ships, he tried to make a little money out of them by trading with them, when he did not wish to use them for combattant purposes. Naval battles were fought between merchant ships, hastily equipped for fighting purposes, and with their crews reinforced by land soldiers, who strove to carry out on shipboard the appropriate tactics of the land. And the mediæval sailor was the more readily turned from commerce to warfare, since in the quietest of times he kept his hand in fighting trim by a little piracy on his own account and an occasional scuffle with his commercial rivals, who were by no means necessarily of an enemy or even of a foreign nation. Thus mediæval fighting navies, even more than mediæval armies, were improvisations, almost as much as the splendid improvisation which increased the British forces by nearly forty-fold since the early days of the war. Even when special fighting ships were built, as was the case in Tudor England, the converted merchantman could still take its place in the line that withstood the Spanish Armada. The continuance of privateering until the nineteenth century, the doctrine that all enemies' private property taken at sea, and enemies' ships and cargoes were liable to confiscation on capture, the fact that the royal navy of Nelson's days wore no uniform but dressed just as it pleased—are sufficient indications that the line between the amateur and the professional was, even down to quite recent times, less firmly

drawn by sea than by land. But we flattered ourselves that we had got beyond these primitive ways, and, on the eve of the war, the proposal of well-meaning but fatuous idealists to abolish the right of prize at sea nearly received the sanction of the British state.

When war broke out in 1914, things at once lapsed into primitive conditions. The professional navy was found inadequate to hold the seas and protect commerce, and had from the start to be supplemented by "converted" cruisers of the mercantile marine, just as in the days of Elizabeth. The fishing boat and the trawler, the tug, and the yacht were diverted, with their crews, to the same service. Merchant ships had to arm themselves in the hope, too often unrealised, of protecting themselves from submarines. Merchant sailors, too, coldly looked down upon by fighting sailors, proved themselves as skilful, brave, and enterprising as the best professionals of the royal navy. The destruction of property was freely indulged in, without any of the formalities or protection of the prize court. No regard was paid to human life, and the peaceful traveller, even the neutral and the ally, were sacrificed as freely as the armed enemy. Thus on sea even more than on land we have had a reversion to the primitive conditions of unrestricted warfare. There was no longer a line drawn between the professional warrior and the peaceful seaman, and it was well that the conditions of his calling made the merchant sailor as much a trained man as his brother who had enjoyed the king's pay before the war. There was no longer the pretext of any rule of law. The "freedom of the seas," encroached upon in times past, as some people say, by the British naval supremacy, has been overthrown altogether by the more deadly challenge of unrestricted submarine warfare. Thus modern naval warfare for all its developed technique, approaches, nay transcends, in violence and ruthlessness the naval warfare of the middle ages.

It is remarkable that the war which has witnessed the reversion to the armed citizen, both on sea and land, has seen in some measure a reversion towards the ancient tactics of close and individual fighting. After the experiences of the Boer War, many of the experts told us that the land battles of the future would be waged between thin lines of marksmen, lying prone on the ground, behind some hump or tussock that afforded them cover, and blazing away with their rifles against an unseen enemy, similarly scattered, a thousand or more yards away. Shock tactics were pronounced too deadly to be effective; the bayonet

was regarded as equally obsolete with the sword or lance ; cavalry were to survive, partly as scouts, but mainly as "mounted infantry," dragoons in the original and proper sense, who were foot soldiers, like the Boers, using their horses in order to get about quickly from place to place. The present war has shown the growth of a great many unexpected tactics, and even a military expert would be a rash man who prophesied what tactical developments the future may see. But it soon became clear that the tactics of the Boer War were as obsolete as Wellington's infantry squares at Waterloo, or the rush of heavily armed horsemen which bore down the enemy's resistance, not only in early mediæval fields but in the days of Cromwell and Prince Rupert. Trench fighting brought about a revival of eighteenth century, if not of mediæval tactics. Yet trench fighting was but a phase of our recent struggle, and both sides learnt that no real decision could come from its essentially defensive methods, save the slow decision caused by exhaustion. The revival of open fighting in the last phase of the war scrapped many of the lessons learnt in the trenches. Cavalry again vindicated its right to a place in warfare. The lumbering advance of tanks again proved a modern counterpart of the heavy charge of the mail-clad men at arms on their armoured steeds.

In both the stationary and the mobile phases of the war there were curious revivals of ancient tactical methods. The grenadier has again come to his own. In the armies of Louis XIV he was, Evelyn tells us, "a new sort of soldier," "dexterous in throwing hand grenades," and so useful that every battalion had its "grenadier company". The term degenerated, like the analogous terms fusilier and rifleman, until it became a mere designation for special regiments of a superior type. But the seventeenth century grenadier has his exact counterpart in the bombing sections of every battalion in the trenches of the Western front, and besides these every infantryman may on occasion become a true grenadier. With hand-bombs have come back the bayonet as a practical weapon, and still more the knife and the other implements of a fierce hand-to-hand fight at the bottom of a narrow ditch, under closer conditions of contact than even the *mêlée* of the feudal battle. If these revivals in weapons only take us back to the seventeenth century, we are taken straight back to the middle ages by the curious recrudescence of armour, which had up to now survived purely for show purposes in the cuirasses of some heavy cavalry regiments, as

useless as the fur busbies of the foot guards. The steel trench helmet, the roughly made but effective iron breast-plate of the modern infantry soldier, take us back to the man-at-arms of the ages before gunpowder. For a time cavalry became as useless as were the mounted knights of the fourteenth century, when, learning at last the lesson of Crecy, the French men-at-arms left their horses in the rear, and sought at Poitiers, and even earlier, to meet their English rivals on foot, aiming, as we have been aiming in Flanders, to defeat the enemy by copying his tactics. It was not, however, by mere copying that the tide of victory changed. In the fourteenth century France first learnt to defeat England when she found out how to avoid pitched battles altogether, but a merely evasive policy gained her only a negative victory. France did not secure the decisive expulsion of the English from her national soil until her skilful use of the resources of field fortification and field artillery enabled her to win the day at Castillon, and so revenge Crecy and Agincourt.

Other revivals bring home even more closely the fact that, given similar conditions, the human agent will revert to similar means of dealing with them. Allenby's great enveloping movements, with vast forces of cavalry, might well have been the tactics of a Crusader or a Saladin, had these warriors resources for such a fight. But it was the methods of modern warfare that made these great sweeps of encircling horse deadly in their consequences to the Turkish army. Yet the eastern campaigns were in other ways prolific of survivals. Thus I have been told by warriors from the Egyptian and Palestinian front that the Turks sometimes dug trenches, covered over slightly with earth or wattles so that any crossing them would fall into the trench upon the points of projecting spikes of wood and iron, much after the fashion in which, according to some accounts, the Scottish prepared to withstand the English advance to Stirling on the eve of Bannockburn. Even the latest Teutonic additions to the horrors of war, such as the poison gases, the lachrymatory and asphyxiating shells, the projection of living flames from special "flame-throwers," are they not the perfection by modern science of the rude approximations in the same direction made in the middle ages? The Greek fire that at first roused panic in the breasts of Crusaders, the primitive "stink pots" of barbarous warfare are only two instances of such devices. Is not the tank a glorification, propelled by mechanical means, of the mechanical

chariot of primitive warfare? Do not the motor lorry and the impressed motor omnibus provide better means for rapid transport than the horses of the mediæval knight and the seventeenth century dragoon? And some up-to-date trench mortars are not very unlike the smaller sort of primitive cannon, while even the machine gun is but the perfection of the earliest type of fire-arms known in the West, the primitive *mitrailleuse* called a ribald (*ribaud*, *ribaudequin*) known in Flanders by 1338, and quite possibly dragged about in carts by Edward III during the Crecy campaign of 1346.¹ And if these forerunners of modern weapons were ineffective enough instruments of war, they at least made a prodigious noise and smoke, and suggested possibilities of horror wherein lies half the effect of new martial devices. Even the deadly fumes of poison gas have ceased now to have all the terrors which it possessed, when first launched against the Canadians in the northern parts of the Ypres salient.

Nowadays we may doubt whether such devices will in the long run settle a great war. It is certain that it was not in corresponding refinements that the strength of mediæval warfare consisted. The effective weapons of the mediæval warrior were few and simple, the lance, the sword, the bow and the arrow. The technical equipment, though carefully perfected, was on a small scale. And it is characteristic of mediæval conditions that the king's chamber, that is the king's bedroom, was the centre of the organisation which supplied the English armies in France with their arms and armour, not only their everyday weapons, but especially with guns and gunpowder, and the great crossbows, catapalts, mangonels, and *trébuchets*, which, before the invention of fire-arms, were the chief instruments of assault against fortified places. To investigate the early history of fire-arms in England, we have to consult the records of the king's chamber and of that branch of it which grew up under the name of the king's privy wardrobe in the Tower of London. Just as the chamber was the bedroom, so the wardrobe was the adjacent dressing room. The confidential domestic attendants of the king gradually formed a little office, which undertook the management of his army and navy, as well as his realm and household. What a contrast between these modest organisations and

¹ See for this my article on "Fire-Arms in the Fourteenth Century" in *English Historical Review*, xxvi., 666.

the recent requisitioning of nearly the whole of our engineering trades to supply the munitions for the present struggle !

Besides the points of contact I have already indicated, there were some other remarkable approximations between the English wars in France in the fourteenth century and those we have been waging there nowadays. For one thing cavalry has in both cases ceased to be an arm of the first importance in serious engagements. The English had learnt, before the Hundred Years' War began, to dismount the knights and men-at-arms, who constituted the chief strength of armies in those days. They were then stationed in close array in a strong defensive position. Their flanks were supported by archers, and the whole array stood still while the enemy charged on horseback. But the missiles of the archers thinned their ranks, and those who reached the enemy could never penetrate the dense hedge of spears, held firmly by mail-clad warriors standing shoulder to shoulder. Thus the impotence of cavalry was the result not only of the perfection of infantry tactics, but still more to the immense improvement of missiles, which for the first time made it possible to stop a cavalry charge, inevitably presenting wide targets to well-directed projectiles. The arrow anticipated the bullet, and the rifle and the machine gun have continued the same conditions to our own day. Accordingly the only use left for horsemen in the fourteenth-century battle was in the preliminary scouting and skirmishing operations, which, as a matter of chivalrous etiquette, preceded the serious fighting, but never had any intimate relation to it. Horses were only really needed in warfare to carry the steel-clad warrior from place to place, more rapidly and with less discomfort than his own legs could. As the rate of the army was the rate of the slowest moving members of it, the English found it expedient to mount the whole of their troops on horseback on those rapidly moving expeditions in which France was traversed from one end to the other. Even the archers became "horse archers". But every arm fought on foot on the rare occasions in which they had a chance of joining battle at all. Nowadays motor and railway transport, and even the bicycle, have made the horse ineffective for covering the ground, save only that all mechanical transport, save in the air, involve roads or rails. In their absence or after their destruction, the horse found his chance again in the latest phases of the war in the West.

Two other characteristics of late mediæval warfare follow from

what I have suggested, namely, the great mobility of a mediæval expeditionary force and the superiority of defensive over offensive tactics. At first sight these qualities seem to be contradictory of each other, for if an army could move rapidly where it liked, was it not carrying out a policy of rapid offensive? But the mobility even of the all-mounted expeditions of the Black Prince, was limited to the open country. Through this they could wander at their pleasure, burning and destroying as they went along. Thus in 1355 the Black Prince marched right across southern France from Bordeaux to Narbonne and back again without encountering serious resistance. In 1356 he led his troops as far north as the Loire and, though good luck enabled him to tempt the enemy to seek destruction at the battle of Poitiers, the battle itself was but the accident of the campaign. Again in 1359 King Edward himself marched from Calais to Reims, on a line sometimes parallel to and sometimes crossing the entrenched positions, where for more than three years the rival armies faced each other with only minor changes of position. This expedition was the more remarkable since it started in November and continued through the winter and spring. The chief military episode was the siege of Reims in mid-winter. After six weeks of unprofitable attack, the city proved impregnable, and Edward moved southwards into Burgundy and thence wheeled back to the suburbs of Paris, where another assault failed. Finally, he concluded the campaign near Chartres, half-way towards the Loire, by the famous treaty of Bretigny. The moral of all these campaigns was, that while the English could wander through the French countryside at their pleasure, they were checked by any castle and most towns that seriously tried to resist them. And the smallness of the expeditionary force—a few thousand men at the most—made it impossible for it to conquer the land they passed through. When the invaders got tired and went home, a black band of desolation alone remained to mark their progress. Have the Germans in Belgium or northern France done much more than this? The chief difference is that their band of desolation is terribly broadened out over a vast countryside.

Any indication of the limits to the mobility and effectiveness of the mediæval host at once suggests the contrasts of our modern fashions of fighting. It is only against a weak or an unprepared enemy that even the magnificent discipline of Germany, aided by roads, railways,

automobiles, zeppelins, aeroplanes, and the other modern devices, can effect quick movement. Germans could overrun northern France before its armies were ready, but they were brought to a stop. They overwhelmed a Serbia or a Belgium. But a Roumania, and still more an Italy, could show capacity for resistance when the first rush of the invader had spent its force. Then followed the long and weary round of trench warfare, of a war of temporary fortresses springing up in the open country as the result of modern man's control over matter. Thereupon modern armies lost all their mobility, and even a rash advance a few miles beyond the limit of safety turned a victory into a severe check, as we all know happened outside Cambrai in 1917. We all know the astounding collapse of Germany in the autumn of 1918. Contrariwise, when the modern army advances, it has numbers and resources enough to make its own all the land which it has traversed. We did this ourselves in Mesopotamia and Palestine, and still more effectively in the rebound in 1918, when we won back Flanders and Northern France, much as the enemy accomplished the same purpose in Belgium, in Northern France, in Serbia, in Roumania, in Poland, and the Baltic Provinces. Thus, despite the modern facilities for locomotion, the modern host moves slowly, but when it moves it moves thoroughly. In particular, modern artillery and explosives have destroyed the value of permanent fortifications. The defence works of a Brialmont at Liège and Antwerp, were as powerless to check the German advance, as were the long obsolete enceintes of a Vauban, or for that matter the mediæval castle, which, if we may believe the Germans, is still so mighty an instrument of defence that it was necessary to shell the raised Keep of Scarborough, which 600 years ago failed to protect Peter Gaveston from a scratch baronial force. It was in those impromptu lines of trenches that saved the allies on the Western front, that the superiority of a good defence over a good attack was most clearly manifested. On the other hand, the mediæval army, though compelled to respect castles and fortresses, could wander where it liked, and as fast as it could, provided always that it shirked a risky pitched battle, where all might be lost in a day. Moreover, it lived on the country, and dispensed with a base and with communications. However, as soon as the mediæval army moved on to a further stage, the inhabitants came back, rebuilt their burnt-out houses, and retilled

their devastated fields. To this day the presence of early buildings in places which, according to the chroniclers, had been utterly destroyed, showed how hard it was for mediæval man to tear stone from stone, or indeed to destroy anything that could not be consumed by fire.

Along with the remorselessness and the resourcefulness of the modern army goes a persistence that was rarely manifested by the spasmodic and easy-going warrior of the ages of chivalry. In the fourteenth century the difficulty was not to raise an army so much as to keep it in the field. After a few weeks, everybody grew tired of his job and wanted to get home again. The roads between a mediæval host and its base were full of war-weary warriors returning home, and a constant stream of recruits was necessary to keep the army alive. The constant traffic to and from France of our soldiers these five years past reproduced these conditions. But our almost illimitable capacity of sending more men to the fray enabled us to keep the fighting going, despite the constant wastage. But the inevitable war wastage from casualties and sickness was, as a rule, much less in the middle ages than in our own days. Pitched battles were exceptional; marching and counter-marching were the order of the day; and there are no instances in all mediæval history of those battles, prolonged for weeks and weeks, which were so characteristic of our recent struggle.

The fitful purposelessness of many mediæval campaigns was the result partly of mediæval character and partly of the scantiness of mediæval resources. It is also in part to be ascribed to the want of any organised "brain of the army," such as is represented by the modern general staff. It is curious how a tactical perfection, which the best modern army might envy, was combined with a strange want of direction and policy in the higher command. Mediæval tactics were, in short, better than mediæval strategy, and if, as we know to our cost, some of the best trained modern commanders of armies have left something to seek in strategical direction, we must freely allow that the heads of a modern army are more professional and more intelligent than their mediæval counterparts. For one thing the higher commands went to kings and noblemen who ruled by hereditary right. On the whole they attained a very respectable standard, either personally or through their advisers. But we must guess rather than know who stood to mediæval generals like Edward III, the Black Prince and

Henry V in the place of the "chief of the staff" to the hereditary "war lords" of modern Germany. Anyhow we cannot expect from an ex-officio commander the insight of a Du Guesclin or a Clisson, of a Calveley or a Chandos.

Many modern writers speak of mediæval commanders as if they had no general strategical ideas at all. This is surely an exaggeration, for upon exceptional occasions mediæval war leaders showed a very intelligent grasp of the problem before them, and a real power of solving it. The dexterity with which Edward III in 1346 and the Black Prince in 1356 took bad risks in order to entice the hesitating French to hazard a general engagement, had its reward in the decisive glories of Crecy and Poitiers. At Poitiers in particular, it is not impossible that the Black Prince anticipated, on a very modest scale, the daring march of Kluck in 1914, with an undefeated enemy on his flank. And on the rare occasions when a fourteenth-century general set himself out to do his job thoroughly, his manner of executing his task, left little to be desired. Witness, for instance, the grim determination with which Edward I stuck to his task of subjecting thoroughly North Wales to his sway in 1282-1283. Neither the hardships of a mountain winter, nor the strong inclination of his followers to go home as soon as they had broken the back of the enemies' resistance, nor the disasters incidental even to successful campaigns, nor lack of money, nor baronial discontent, could move him from his work until he had secured the absolute subjection and conquest of the whole region that had been within the sphere of Llywelyn's influence. Witness, too, the persistence with which the same strenuous soldier carried through again and again the harder task of conquering Scotland. Again, in a later age, Henry V's victory of Agincourt had perhaps more moral than material result; but Henry's subsequent complete conquest of Normandy between 1416 and 1419, had its reward in the English administration of Normandy for some thirty years on end. And there was real insight in the policy which Scotland learnt for generations from Robert Bruce, the policy, I mean, of avoiding battle, abolishing strongholds and standing aside, while the English invaders wore themselves out in futile marchings, forays and skirmishes. This policy, bettered by Du Guesclin and Clisson, was in its turn successful in the hands of the French in undoing the triumphs of Edward III and his son in France, without so much as fighting a battle. Let us not in our

appreciation of mediæval tactics, always think too meanly of the occasional outbursts of mediæval strategy. And let us be fair in setting down some part of its habitual mediocrity to the lack of the means of obtaining information, the lack of the material means for enforcing their decisions, and the lack of the organised subordination of the lesser to the larger units, rather than to an invincible ignorance which fails to solve a problem because it fails to conceive its existence. Even with modern resources, heaven-born strategists are among the rarest gifts of the God of battles. It required nearly four years of warfare, plus an immediate prospect of collapse, to bring a Foch into the position of *generalissimo*.

Considering their difficulties, mediæval armies of the better sort did wonderfully well. Besides the difficulties I have already suggested, I should like to emphasize one, which, in itself, would seem fatal to decisive fighting. This was the want of anything corresponding to the ordered concentric circles of the modern army, the battalion, the brigade, the division, the army corps. In a fourteenth-century army there were roughly speaking only two typical elements. Firstly there were the men-at-arms, heavily armoured, slow in movement, but magnificently equipped and weaponed. These were not, as I have said, cavalry, but the solidest, most substantial, and well-to-do infantry that the world has ever seen. Then there were the light infantry, represented at his best by the English or Welsh archer, lightly equipped, adequately, but less well paid, belonging as a rule to the yeomanry rather than to the gentry, able to run about freely by reason of his lack of protective armour, and always competent to escape from the enemy's heavily armed troops by reason of his superior mobility. Each of these arms were organised and commanded separately. The men-at-arms were grouped under "constabularies," under officers called constables, and the constabularies were aggregated into groups so styled and these under "banners," the latter commanded by an experienced knight called a banneret, under whose flag the unit served. The archers were grouped into twenties and hundreds, commanded by a *vin-tenarius* and a *centenarius* respectively. But a cross division followed, since the best element in the army was provided by knights and barons of experience, contracting to levy and equip a certain number of soldiers of both types, who formed a natural unit under their immediate employer. All these made the organisation effective enough

up to what in the modern army corresponds to the company, the squadron, or the battalion. The ultimate element in the army was the "retinue" of the earl or baron who had contracted with the king to serve. But while a great prince or earl might come to the field with over a thousand followers, the petty lord might arrive with the merest handful. It is hard to see how these were shaken down into any sort of common body. The process by which it was done is extremely vague, and the strong character of the supreme commanders, the devoted loyalty of the subordinate chieftains, alone compensated for the lack of higher organisation, though the three "battles" in which the army normally moved and fought, suggested a subdivision analogous to the brigade or the division. But since the armies which won Crecy and Agincourt probably started from England some 10,000 strong, we see clearly that the problem of higher organisation was not a very practical one. I doubt whether any mobile expeditionary force sent out from mediæval England ever mustered much more than the numbers of a single division of a modern army.

By the thirteenth century the "artillery" had become important, but in those days artillery meant machines for throwing stones by tension or torsion, and battering rams and their like moved by main force. During the fourteenth century artillery became cannon, propelled by gunpowder, and the archaic apparatus of siege craft retreated into insignificance. To modern eyes the part played by primitive fire-arms was insignificant enough; but early cannons were soon strong enough to destroy the defences of many strongholds at one time deemed impregnable except by famine. But the mechanics who directed the siege train and field pieces of a mediæval army were not soldiers but craftsmen. Very often the same men who had cast the guns took them to the field and manipulated them there. In any case they were classified and paid along with the masons, smiths, carpenters, miners, and other practical men, who faintly anticipate the engineers, artillery, and labour or pioneer battalions of a modern army. In the army which conquered Calais in 1347, the greatest English force ever sent overseas in the middle ages, there were about 300 of these experts to a grand total of nearly 30,000 men. The chivalrous warrior despised these rough mechanics as civilians and outsiders, just as the old school of naval "fighting officer" was wont, not so long ago, to look down upon the officers responsible for the engine room. And in

a mediæval army, where high office went to hereditary magnates, and lower office to landed men of good social position, there was more reason for this than in a modern democracy. Yet it would be rash to say that the old notion of social caste has entirely disappeared nowadays from either service. It was one of the good results of the Hundred Years' War that it brought to the front a group of landless men, who won reputation and high position simply because they were good soldiers. May the present struggle in which all classes co-operate for a common object have the result of making the British army really democratic in character !


Elaborate preparations were made in Edwardian armies for the collection of food supplies, munitions, and transport. Though they seem small to us, I feel sure that the armies sent by Edward III to the Continent were as well provided both as respects commissariat, transport, and technical auxiliaries as any army sent out of England until our own days. It is only the silence of records as to anything approaching a medical and surgical service that the mediæval army was obviously inferior to the Georgian and early Victorian ones. This shows, perhaps, the hard-heartedness of mediæval man ; but the medicine and surgery of those days was such that there was something to be said for not having too much of it.

I must bring my rather desultory observations to a close. If I have, despite my promise, spoken more of mediæval than of modern armies, you must forgive the prejudices of the mediævalist, who would be still more apologetic did he not know that nowadays the organisation and fighting methods of a modern army are painfully familiar to all. As usual, I feel disposed to harp at the end on the points of similarity rather than the points of difference. For the points of difference are dependent on our infinite superiority nowadays in numbers, wealth, resources and mechanical equipment. More at the root of the matter lies our inability, then as now, to prepare for war, our hasty improvisations, our lack of definite policy, and, also I am bound to add, our wonderful power of getting over all our initial troubles, and pulling through successfully towards the end. Perhaps I should add, that while improvisation was inevitable in an age when standing armies were unknown, the nation that hastily prepared for victory, had, for good or evil, a good deal more of the military temper than we moderns possess. Indeed, it would hardly be too much to say that the England, which

for the best part of a century strove to dominate France, had more affinity to the modern Prussia than we are anxious to confess. In these simpler times the organisation of victory was easier, and the incomparable tactics, which made English soldiers the most famous in Europe, were no improvisations, but the results of the practical deductions of shrewd warriors, schooled by generations of island warfare, to play a great part in continental campaigns. Nor were these tactics wholly English; the Scots taught us the value of heavily equipped dismounted infantry; the Welsh first showed the lessons of archery and of light irregular tactics in combination with the stiff main array; the equipment and armour and spirit of the man-at-arms were common to all Western Europe. There is an anticipation of Prussianism not only in the perfection of tactics and equipment; the same spirit underlay the profound conviction of the justice of a bad cause, and of the direct co-operation of heaven which makes possible a comparison between our Henry V and some modern Teutonic monarchs. Yet let us not press the comparison too far. In honour and chivalry our Henry stands by himself. In the spirit in which war was waged between two great and self-respecting nations, the five centuries between the two periods we compare do not show as much progress as might be wished. But, perhaps, a more important reflection to carry away with us is the feeling that, while in the middle ages war was part of the natural course of things, it is nowadays a horror that the western democracies were not ready for, because they believed and hoped it would never come. It is the terrible contrast between the perfection of the peace that all western societies generally enjoyed up to 1914, and the results of this most colossal of conflicts that strikes us as so overwhelming. To mediæval man the state of peace was so disorderly, the waging of war so imperfect and so casual, that there was never so great a contrast as we experience between the two. War hurts more in a modern state, because it brings about so much greater changes in our habits, not only for those who are actual fighters, but also for those who work at home.

The obvious moral of all this is that we must strive to put an end to war. But all the teaching of history is wrong if we flatter ourselves that changes of machinery and organisation will do much good, unless it is accompanied by a change of heart such as all history shows can only result from a painful and slow process of training and

education. We have fought our great fight to the end : we have presented to our most formidable enemy the terms on which we will vouchsafe him a permanent peace : rumours of peace and conciliation jostle with stories of discords and difficulties : we have been told what is designed to build up a league of nations and plans for making war so difficult as to be almost impossible. Let us wish all success to those plans : but do not let us underestimate the difficulties in the way of their fulfilment. When we read of the fierce national jealousies of the newly emancipated nations of Eastern Europe, of the anarchy of Russia, of the revival of the worst forms of German ascendancy claims in the Weimar assembly, and even of the industrial unrest at home, is there not reason for apprehension as to whether there exists even now the right mental attitude which the new world of peace requires if it is ever to be made a reality ? Here again mediæval history has its lesson. It had its truces of God and its leagues of peace ; it had its real internationalism in the Church and its sham internationalism in the Empire. But how futile was this homage to the ideal when the plain facts of life would not square with it ? And what will be the use of putting an end to the war of nations if a more cruel war of classes is brought in to replace it ? Let us believe that the good sense of the average man, the general will of civilised humanity, will find a sound solution of all these problems.



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